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ORDER: PRESIDENT BUSH AND THE EXPANSION OF 
CHARITABLE CHOICE 
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ABSTRACT 
This Article analyzes whether President Bush's charitable choice executive 
orders, which permit religious organizations to apply for federal funds to deliver 
social services, are a permissible exercise of presidential power. Although Congress 
has enacted charitable choice provisions in some major statutes, including a 1996 
welfare reform act, it debated but did not extend charitable choice throughout the 
entire federal human services bureaucracy, as the President's executive orders do. 
The core question this Article examines is whether President Bush's charitable choice 
executive orders constitute permissible gap-filling of ambiguous statutes under the 
Chevron doctrine or impermissible exercises of executive lawmaking under Youngstown 
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer. This Article analyzes possible statutory delegations to 
the executive branch, including human services statutes and federal procurement laws 
and concludes that they do not contain gaps that give policy-making discretion to the 
President. With regard to constitutional authority for the orders, recent Supreme 
Court case law makes clear that charitable choice programs are not constitutionally 
compelled. Article IT of the Constitution, which gives the President the authority to 
take care that the laws are faithfully executed, is another possible source of author-
ity, but its bounds are ill defined. Fans of a strong executive argue that presidential 
policy-making best serves constitutional values of accountability and efficiency. This 
Article tests these assumptions and finds that the charitable choice executive orders 
not only fail to further these values, but actually may undermine them. Accordingly, 
the Article concludes that the charitable choice executive orders constitute an un-
lawful aggrandizement of executive power. 
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I signed an Executive order that said that all faith-based groups 
should have equal access to Federal money .... That's what the 
initiative said; it said, "Since Congress isn't moving, I will." 
-President George W. Bush! 
INTRODUCTION 
When President George W. Bush took office in 2001, he immediately announced 
that he would expand the scope of charitable choice programs that provide public 
funds to religious organizations to tackle social problems. 2 The political battle lines 
were soon drawn with proponents praising Bush for tapping into the redemptive 
power of spirituality and opponents prophesizing that the wall of separation between 
church and state would collapse.3 Yet despite the power of the bully pulpit, Bush's 
1 Remarks at the White House Faith-Based and Community Initiatives Leadership 
Conference, 41 WEEKLY COMPo PREs. Doc. 332,338 (Mar. 1,2005). 
2 Jo RENEE FORMICOLA ET AL., FAITH-BASED INITIATIVES AND THE BUSH ADMINIS-
TRATION: THE GOOD, THE BAD, AND THE UGLY 5 (2003). 
3 These arguments are summarized in AMy E. BLACK ET AL., OF LfITLE FAITH: THE 
POLITICS OF GEORGE W. BUSH' S FAITH BASED INITIATIVES 65-73 (2004) and FORMICOLA ET 
AL., supra note 2, at 15-18, 161-81. 
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legislative proposals to expand charitable choice beyond the constraints of existing 
statutes floundered amidst congressional concerns that the bills permitted state-
sponsored employment discrimination against non-believers.4 Despite repeated 
attempts, Republican leaders in Congress could not push through the President's 
charitable choice proposals.5 Then, after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, 
Bush's attention and that of the nation was inevitably drawn abroad. Yet the dis-
appearance of charitable choice from the national headlines does not mean that 
charitable choice has disappeared. 
To the contrary, President Bush has forsaken Congress and delved into his 
executive toolbox-using executive orders, new rulemaking power, bureaucratic 
appointments, funding controls, the creation of a White House office on faith-based 
initiatives with sub-command posts in ten executive agencies, and other privileges 
of his executive authority-to refashion our nation's social service delivery system 
for the needy.6 The affected programs distribute over $7.7 billion a year, and thus, 
not surprisingly, millions of federal dollars are now flowing to religious organiza-
tions to pay for social services.7 Religious organizations have long played a central 
role in alleviating social problems, but charitable choice provides that churches need 
not set up separate, secular non-profit organizations to accept federal funds, a dramatic 
break: from past practices. 8 Although academics have analyzed charitable choice from 
many angles, particularly the complex church-state questions it raises,9 there has been 
scant attention paid to how President Bush has managed to outmaneuver Congress 
to enact his domestic agenda. 10 
4 See infra text accompanying notes 78-80. 
5 See infra notes 78-86 and accompanying text. 
6 See ANNE FARRIS ET AL., THE ExpANDING ADMINISTRATIVE PREsIDENCY: GEORGE W. 
BUSH AND THE FAlTII-BASED INITIATIVE 1 (2004), available at http://www.religionandsocial 
policy.orgidocs/policylFB_Administrative_Presidency-ReporCI0_08_04.pdf. 
7 See FORMICOLA ET AL., supra note 2, at 14; infra text accompanying notes 123-24. 
8 See Michele Estrin Gilman, "Charitable Choice" and the Accountability Challenge: 
Reconciling the Needfor Regulation with the First Amendment Religion Clauses, 55 V AND. 
L. REv. 799, 811 (2002). 
9 For some leading perspectives, see Carl H. Esbeck, Charitable Choice and the Critics, 
57 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 17,22 (2000); Steven K. Green, Charitable Choice and 
Neutrality Theory, 57 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 33 (2000); Marci A. Hamilton, Free? 
Exercise, 42 WM. & MARY L. REv. 823 (2001); Douglas Laycock, The Underlying Unity of 
Separation and Neutrality, 46 EMORY L.J. 43 (1997); Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, The 
Faith-Based Initiative and the Constitution, 55 DEPAULL. REv. 1 (2005); Martha Minow, 
Partners, Not Rivals?: Redrawing the Lines Between Public and Private, Non-Profit and 
Profit, and Secular and Religious, 80 B.D. L. REv. 1061 (2000); David Saperstein, Public 
Accountability and Faith-Based Organizations: A Problem Best A voided, 116 HARV. L. REv. 
1353 (2003); Lewis D. Solomon & Matthew J. Vlissides, Jr., Faith-Based Charities and the 
Quest to Solve America's Social Ills: A Legal and Policy Analysis, 10 CORNEuJ.L. & PUB. 
POL'y 265 (2001). 
10 See BLACK ET AL., supra note 3, at 88-89; see also id. at 89 (''The Bush team hoped to 
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Recently, the scope of the President's executive authority in responding to ter-
rorism has come under scrutiny. President Bush has asserted that as Comrnander-
in-Chief he can: detain "enemy combatants" who are United States citizens without 
giving them an opportunity to contest their detention, authorize military trials for 
suspected terrorists, and conduct warrantless wiretapping of Americans suspected 
of aiding terrorists. II These anti -terrorism tactics are based on a view of the unitary 
executive; that is, a President who has "broad constitutional power to use military 
force to defend the Nation" and can "take whatever actions he deems appropriate 
to pre-empt or respond to terrorist threats from new quarters."12 In the recent case 
of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court rebuffed this unitary executive theory, 
holding that the President could not establish military commissions to try alleged al 
Qaeda combatants without congressional authorization. 13 Yet presidential exercises 
of authority on the domestic side remain below the radar screen. 
The President's forays into faith-based contracting are also founded on a view 
of a unitary executive, and, as with his anti-terrorism tactics, detractors charge that 
they imperil civil liberties. 14 President Bush's expansion of charitable choice affects 
billions of dollars of domestic spending and has the potential to impose religious pref-
erences on millions of needy Americans while expanding the scope of permissible 
hiring discrimination on the basis of religion. 15 While the President arguably has 
greater implied constitutional powers when dealing with foreign affairs and national 
emergencies,'6 no similar justifications apply to matters of domestic policy. As a 
nation, we have become inexcusably blase about presidential domestic lawmaking. 
Indeed, as the executive orders creating President Bush's charitable choice initiative 
reveal, the President no longer feels that he has to make even a feeble attempt to 
appeal to the core Republican constituency of evangelical voters and attract new support among 
conservative Catholics, traditionally Democrats .... "). 
11 See Peter Baker & Jim VandeHei, Clash Is Latest Chapter in Bush Effort to Widen 
Executive Power, WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 2005, at AI; Carol D. Leonnig, Administration Paper 
Defends Spy Program, WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 2006, at AI; David E. Sanger & Eric Lichtblau, 
Administration Starts Weeklong Blitz in Defense of Eavesdropping Program, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 24, 2006, at A18. 
12 Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., Office of Legal 
Counsel, to President George W. Bush pt. 4, para. 11 (Sept. 25,2001), http://www.usdoj 
.gov/olc/warpowers925.htm. 
13 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2774 & n.23 (2006). 
14 See infra text accompanying notes 138-40. 
15 See infra text accompanying notes 154-66. 
16 See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-20 (1936) (discuss-
ing the "plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal gov-
ernment in the field of international relations"); see also Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective 
Power of the Presidency, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 1,47-48 (1993)("[F]romthe beginning, virtually 
everyone recognized that in foreign affairs the President enjoys a freedom of movement and 
authority quite different from that in the domestic realm."). 
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articulate authority for advancing his domestic policies. 17 For its part, Congress often 
acquiesces to executive authority by failing to impose any limits on presidential law-
making, and the courts have ceded power to the President to legislate in any zone 
untouched by Congress. 18 
President Bush's charitable choice strategy reflects two converging developments. 
First, ever since the New Deal, when President Roosevelt created the framework of 
the modern welfare state,19 the executive branch, more than any other branch of 
government, has defined the tone and terrain of our social welfare policies. Amidst 
heightened awareness of economic inequality after the prosperity of the post-war 
years, Presidents Kennedy and Johnson called to their fellow Americans for a War on 
Poverty.20 President Reagan shifted the battleground to a "war on the welfare state,,,21 
and President Clinton oversaw the implementation of welfare reform legislation that 
adopts Reagan's behavioral premises about the causes ofpoverty.22 Notably, wel-
fare reform's major ideas were first conceived of and tested by several governors.23 
President Bush has seized upon charitable choice to further his domestic agenda of 
compassionate conservatism.24 
Second, during the New Deal, President Roosevelt seized increasing control over 
federal regulatory policy,25 an approach that was revitalized by President Reagan, 
who aimed to centralize and coordinate administrative policy,26 and clinched by 
President Clinton, who overtly directed administrative agencies to implement his 
desired policies.27 Today, "the innovation of 'Presidential Government' is trium-
phant in America.,,28 President Bush has inherited and expanded upon these trends. 
17 See infra text accompanying note 254. 
18 See KENNETH R. MAYER, WITH THE STROKE OF A PEN: EXECUTIVE ORDERS AND 
PRESIDENTIAL POWER 56 (2001) ("Unless a presidential act contravenes a clear and explicit 
statutory or constitutional prohibition that directly addresses the action, the courts are likely 
to side with the president."). 
19 See generally W ALTER I. TRATINER,FROMPOORLAWTOWELFARESTATE: A HIsTORY 
OF SOCIAL WELFARE IN AMERICA 280-99 (6th ed. 1999). 
20 See generally id. at 304-31. 
21 [d. at 362-78. 
22 [d. at 388-401. 
23 See, e.g., id. at 281 ("As President Roosevelt acted on the same ideas that had guided 
his actions as governor .... "). 
24 FORMICOLAET AL., supra note 2, at 5 (calling the faith-based initiative "the cornerstone 
of [Bush's] agenda of 'compassionate conservatism'" (internal quotation omitted». 
25 See TRATTNER, supra note 19, at 288 (noting that Roosevelt used executive orders to 
achieve his goals). 
26 See MAYER, supra note 18, at 6. 
27 See id. at 9. 
28 David Gray Adler, The Condition of the Presidency: Clinton in Context, in THE 
PRESIDENCY AND THE LAW: THE CLINTON LEGACY 175, 176 (David Gray Adler & Michael 
A. Genovese eds., 2002). 
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Like President Clinton, he has used his supervisory powers over administrative agen-
cies to accomplish objecti ves that he could not attain through the legislati ve process. 
Accordingly, this Article explores the justifications for and implications of President 
Bush's drive to expand charitable choice without congressional authorization. 
In the leading case of Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, the Supreme 
Court set forth the principle that presidential action must be based on either statutory 
or constitutional authority. 29 At the same time, Justice Jackson's influential concur-
rence noted that there may be times when the President can rely on his "independent 
powers" and act without congressional authorization.30 The boundaries of this "zone 
of twilight" 31 have never been defined or limited, and as a result, the Presidents have 
slowly and steadily increased their powers without check from the other branches. 32 
Of course, reactions to presidential assertions of authority often depend on whose 
ox is being gored. 
It is more difficult to draw principled boundaries on presidential lawmaking. Fans 
of a unitary executive believe that presidential policymaking fulfills twin consti-
tutional commitments to accountability and efficiency?3 However, as this Article 
demonstrates, the charitable choice executive orders (CCEOs) fulfill neither value. 
Indeed, it is particularly difficult to serve these rationales when dealing with policies 
that impact the disadvantaged-people that vote in low numbers, lack money to con-
tribute to political campaigns, and have little organized influence within politics. This 
analysis of the CCEOs suggests that one way to give content to the "zone of twilight" 
is to assess presidential policymaking by the very values of accountability and effi-
ciency that underlay the office of the presidency. 34 In so doing, we further our own 
constitutional commitments to a unitary executive while avoiding the risk of presi-
dential tyranny. 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes President Bush's charitable 
choice initiative from its tortured death in Congress to its resurrection in the exec-
utive branch. Although there are at least four major human services statutes that 
include charitable choice provisions, President Bush has single-handedly expanded 
charitable choice into hundreds of statutes that do not contain legislative authority 
for a faith-based approach.35 The Court has never articulated a principled basis for 
distinguishing between presidential lawmaking (not permissible) and executi ve branch 
gap-filling of ambiguous statutes (perfectly fine).36 Analysis of the President's 
29 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
30 [d. at 637. 
31 [d. 
32 See infra Part II.A. 
33 See infra text accompanying notes 478-81. 
34 See discussion infra Part IV.B.2. 
35 See discussion infra Part II.B. 
36 See Monaghan, supra note 16, at 41 (noting that the boundary is "of course, context-
sensitive and malleable"). 
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CCEOs demonstrates that drawing such a line is not only exceedingly difficult, but 
also that the resulting confusion results in the aggrandizement of presidential power. 
President Bush has not articulated the source of his authority to issue the CCEOs, 
which is not surprising given how entrenched presidential ownership of the admin-
istrative process has become. Nevertheless, by looking at justifications offered by 
prior Presidents for their executive orders as well as Bush's arguments in favor of 
expansive executive war powers, a likely presidential defense of the CCEOs can be 
gleaned. Accordingly, the Article explores both statutory and constitutionaljusti-
fications for the CCEOs. In light of Youngstown's emphasis on congressional in-
tent, Part II first explores possible statutory justifications for the CCEOs. This Part 
discusses why the President's whole-scale imposition of charitable choice over the 
human services bureaucracy does not constitute gap-filling of ambiguous statutes in 
the face of congressional silence, but rather, contravention of congressional under-
standings at the time those statutes were passed. The delegation argument is further 
weakened by Congress's failure to enact legislation that would have accomplished 
the same goals as the CCEOs. 
Part II also addresses whether the President's powers over federal procurement 
justify the CCEOs. Although Presidents have long used the federal procurement 
system to advance anti-discrimination norms,37 the CCEOs cannot similarly be justi-
fied by the rationales of efficiency and economy that underlay the federal procurement 
statutes. To the contrary, there is no empirical evidence that a sectarian approach 
is superior to a secular approach in social service delivery. But there is plenty of evi-
dence that congregations lack the know-how to engage in the complexities of social 
service delivery or to comply with government accountability mechanisrns.38 
Given that there is no viable statutory authority for the CCEOs, the Article then 
explores possible constitutional justifications for the CCEOs. Part ill examines the 
contention made by several First Amendment scholars that the CCEOs are constitu-
tionally mandated to create a fair playing field between churches and othernon-profits 
in federal contracting. In recent years, the Supreme Court has become more accepting 
of government funding schemes that include religious organizations. However, the 
Court has made it clear that while such funding programs are permissible if enacted 
by a legislature, they are not mandatory.39 Under current law, President Bush would 
be hard-pressed to argue that the CCEOs fulfill a constitutional mandate. 
Part IV then discusses the President's strongest justification for the CCEOs, which 
is the Take Care Clause. Presidents have long relied on the Take Care Clause in Article 
II of the Constitution to manage the output of administrative agencies. President 
Reagan and each of his predecessors have used a series of executive orders in attempt-
ing to centralize review of agency regulations in the White House, to improve the 
37 See infra text accompanying notes 267-81. 
38 See infra text accompanying notes 333-46. 
39 See infra text accompanying notes 371-76. 
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content of regulations (in line with presidential anti- or pro-regulation philosophies), 
and to reduce inconsistencies and conflict among the federal agencies.40 However, 
the CCEOs go far beyond these managerial mechanisms by imposing a substantive 
preference for religion in social service contracting, and thus, they cannot rest on the 
same rationales as the regulatory review executive orders. 
Moreover, the President is not merely attempting to persuade the agencies to 
adopt faith-based preferences (and the agencies would be acting arbitrarily and capri-
ciously if they did so); he is directing a specific outcome. Such directory authority 
is based on a theory of the unitary executive that hinges on both constitutional and 
normative arguments positing that the President is more accountable and efficient 
than either the bureaucracy or Congress. While these assumptions are frequently de-
bated by legal scholars, they are rarely examined in a real-life context. This Article 
puts these assumptions to the test, and it fmds that the President's implementation of 
the CCEOs actually lessens accountability by cutting off dialogue and debate over 
important First Amendment values, eliminating the expertise of agencies in making 
program decisions, and undermining norms of public participation in the policy-
making process. Where efficiency and accountability are fostered, the President has 
a strong case for acting in the Youngstown zone oftwilight. But where these values 
are hindered, it is dangerous to grant the President implied powers to implement 
domestic policy. The Article concludes that the CCEOs lack either statutory or con-
stitutional authority and thus constitute impermissible presidential lawmaking. 
I. IMPLEMENTATION OF CHARITABLE CHOICE 
The President's charitable choice initiative, patterned after the 1996 welfare re-
form statute, was considered by both houses of Congress but never enacted.41 This 
Part discusses the history of charitable choice, the scope and impact of the charitable 
choice executive orders, and the potential civil liberties threats posed by the orders. 
With this background in place, we can then begin to assess the legitimacy of the CCEOs. 
A. Congress Considers 
Charitable choice debuted in 1996, enacted by Congress as part of the massi ve 
reform of the federal welfare system and entitled the Personal Responsibility and 
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRA).42 The major goals of the 
40 See generally MAYER, supra note 18. 
41 See FORMICOLA ET AL., supra note 2, at 13. 
42 Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 104, 110 Stat. 2105, 2161-63 (1996) (codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 604a (Supp. ill 1997» [hereinafterPRA]. Prior to thePRA, Aid to Families With Dependent 
Children (AFDC) provided welfare as an entitlement to needy families based on objective 
criteria. The public, policymakers, and the press widely viewed AFDC as a failure that en-
couraged dependency while failing to solve poverty or its associated problems. For an 
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PRA were to move welfare recipients into the workplace and to foster two-parent 
families.43 To effectuate these goals, the PRA restructured the delivery of welfare 
services by devolving authority over program design to the state and 10callevel.44 
In tum, state and local governments were permitted to contract with private entities, 
including religious organizations, for delivery of welfare services or to provide bene-
ficiaries with vouchers redeemable at private social service providers.45 This down-
ward devolution of governmental authority and inclusion of churches as contracting 
partners was a shift from prior law and practice.46 
The charitable choice provisions in the PRA attempted to ease First Amendment 
church-state separation concerns while simultaneously preserving the religious char-
acter of grantees.47 To protect against coercion of beneficiaries, the statute provided 
that religious organizations could not discriminate against beneficiaries on the basis 
of religion48 or use charitable choice funds for proselytizing or worship.49 Addition-
ally, states must provide nonsectarian alternatives for beneficiaries who object to the 
religious character of their provider. 50 To protect the religious character of grantees, 
the statute allowed religious organizations to provide social services without altering 
their internal governance structures or removing religious art, icons, or other symbols 
from their premises51 and exempted them from Title VII's nondiscrimination in em-
ployment requirements.52 
Religious organizations have long been an essential part of our nation's efforts 
to relieve poverty.53 However, prior to the PRA, the government did not fund 
churches directly. 54 Rather, religious groups that contracted with federal, state, and 
local governments to deliver social services set up independent, tax-exempt orga-
nizations, such as Catholic Charities and Lutheran Social Services, to administer 
those funds.55 The Supreme Court held in 1988 that although religiously affiliated 
influential critique, see CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN SOCIAL POUCY, 
1950-1980, at 17-19, 162-64 (2d ed. 1994). 
43 PRA, at, § 101, 110 Stat. at 2110-12. 
44 Id. § 104, 110 Stat. at 2161--63. 
45 Id. § l04(b), 110 Stat. at 2162. 
46 See Gilman, supra note 8, at 811. 
47 PRA, § 104(b)(d), 110 Stat. at 2162. 
48 Id. § l04(g), 110 Stat. at 2163. 
49 Id. § 104(j), 110 Stat. at 2163. 
sOld. § l04(e)(1), 110 Stat. at 2162--63. 
slId. § 104(d)(2), 110 Stat. at 2162. 
52 Id. § 104(0, 110 Stat. at 2163. 
53 See Donald T. Critchlow & Charles H. Parker, Introduction to WITH Us ALWAYS: A 
HISTORY OF PRIv ATE CHARITY AND PuBUC WElFARE 2 (Donald T. Critchlow & Charles H. 
Parker eds., 1998); see also STEPHEN V. MONSMA, WHEN SACRED AND SECULAR MIX: 
REuGIOUS NONPROm ORGANIZATIONS AND PuBUC MONEY 7-9 (1996). 
54 See Gilman, supra note 8, at 811. In this Article, the term "church" refers generally to 
churches, synagogues, mosques, and other houses of prayer. 
55 See id. 
1112 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 15: 1103 
organizations could receive federal funds without running afoul of the First Amend-
ment's prohibition on governmental establishment of religion, the money could not 
flow to "pervasively sectarian" organizations or fund religious activities.56 In the 
late 1980s and early 1990s, a group of conservative academics and policymakers 
began challenging the "pervasively sectarian" dividing line. 57 These thinkers aimed 
to foster a "civil society" that would bring religion into the public domain and view 
faith communities as an integral solution for social problems.58 For instance, John 
Ashcroft, the chief sponsor of charitable choice legislation,59 argued that involving 
religious groups in social welfare was necessary to combat the "miserable failure" 
of governmental programs.60 The PRA ultimately codified this viewpoint. 61 
As a result of the PRA, churches are now vying with other pri vate social service 
providers for government contracts to deliver welfare benefits and related services 
ranging from substance abuse treatment to job training programs.62 Despite the fun-
damental shift that charitable choice effectuated in church-state relationships, the 
provision barely registered in the debates over the PRA.63 Rather, heated debates 
centered on the proposed "lifetime limits on the receipt of welfare benefits (no one 
can get welfare benefits for more than five years) and other provisions designed to 
alter the perceived behavior of welfare recipients" (e.g., welfare recipients must work 
to receive benefits).64 The Clinton administration did little to implement charitable 
choice once it was on the books.65 The few states that were already pursuing faith-
based partnerships in social service delivery found support in the federal legislation; 
56 Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 593, 616 (1988) (tying such funding to excessive 
government entanglement with religion under the Lemon test). 
57 See ROBERT WUTHNOW, SAVING AMERICA? FAITH-BASED SERVICES AND THE FuTuRE 
OF CIVIL SOCIETY 12-13 (2004). 
58 See id. at 15-24. An influential book propounding this perspective is MARVIN DLASKY, 
THE TRAGEDY OF AMERICAN COMPASSION (1992). 
59 See WUTHNOW, supra note 57, at 298 (noting that Ashcroft was "haled by conservative 
evangelical leaders as an ally on Capitol Hill"). 
60 142 CONGo REc. S8507 (daily ed. July 23, 1996) (statement of Sen. Ashcroft); see also 
141 CONGo REc. S13500, 13500-02 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1995) (statement of Sen. Ashcroft) 
(discussing the problems of the welfare system and the benefits of faith-based charities); 141 
CONGo REc. S12924, 12924-25 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 1995) (statement of Sen. Ashcroft) (also 
discussing the problems of the welfare system and the benefits of faith-based charities). 
61 See PRA, Pub. L.No. 104-193, § 101, 11OStat. 2105,2161-63 (1996). Similar charitable 
choice provisions were also added to the Welfare-to-Work block grant program, 42 U.S.C. § 
603(a)(5) (2000); the Community Services Block Grant programs, 42 U.S.c. § 9920 (2000); 
and some Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration drug treatment 
funding, 42 U.S.C. § 290kk-l (2000). 
62 See FORMICOLA ET AL., supra note 2, at 96-97. 
63 See BLACK ET AL., supra note 3, at 53 ("In the overall context of welfare reform, chari-
table choice was a small side issue."). 
64 See Gilman, supra note 8, at 809. 
65 See BLACK ET AL., supra note 3, at 62. 
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other states left the opportunity alone.66 It was not until the 2000 presidential cam-
paign that charitable choice leapt into the national consciousness.67 
As they campaigned, then Vice President Gore and then Governor Bush advo-
cated for the expansion of charitable choice into other government programs.68 Both 
candidates seized upon the opportunity to woo moderate voters, who had become in-
creasingly tolerant of religious expression within the public sphere.69 Then Governor 
Bush was already promoting charitable choice within Texas's social service programs, 
and he had issued a gubernatorial executive order that required Texas agencies to en-
courage faith-based contracting.70 On a personal level, charitable choice resonated 
for Bush because of his own religious conversion, which helped him overcome a 
drinking problem.71 As a political matter, charitable choice was part of Bush' s com-
passionate conservativism agenda, allowing him to appeal not only to his electoral 
base of religious conservatives and evangelicals, but also to court potential supporters 
among urban Latinos and African Americans, who tend to vote Democratic while 
also being strongly religious.72 
Not surprisingly, as one of his first actions as President, Bush announced the 
formation of a high-profile White House Office of Faith-Based and Community 
Initiatives (OFBCI), whose director was titled an Assistant to the President, the 
highest ranking title for White House staffers.73 He also created satellite offices in 
five cabinet level agencies (the Departments of Labor, Education, Health and Human 
Services, Housing and Urban Development, and Justice) and directed them to expand 
charitable choice into all their federal human services programs by identifying and 
removing regulatory barriers that discouraged federal contracting with faith-based 
groupS.74 At the end of July 2001, these agencies delivered a detailed program audit 
to the White House, which then assembled the results in a report entitled Unlevel 
Playing Field.75 The report charged that existing agency rules were "repressive, 
restrictive, and ... actively undermine the established civil rights" of religious groups 
66 See id. 
67 See Daniel O. Conkle, Religion, Politics, and the 2000 Presidential Election: A Selective 
Survey and Tentative Appraisal, 77 IND. LJ. 247,248 (2002) ("During the 2000 presidential 
campaign ... the issue of Charitable Choice was prominent.") 
68 See BLACK ET AL., supra note 3, at 82-83. 
69 See id. at 82. 
70 See FARRIS ET AL., supra note 6, at 4. 
71 See BLACK ET AL., supra note 3, at 88; FARRIS ET AL., supra note 6, at 3. 
72 See BLACK ET AL, supra note 3, at 87-89. 
73 Exec. Order No. 13,199,3 C.F.R. 752-54 (2001), reprinted in 2 U.S.c. ch. 2 (2006); 
see BLACK ET AL., supra note 3, at 202. 
74 Exec. Order No. 13,198,3 C.F.R. 750-52 (2001), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2006). 
75 WHITEHOUSE, UNlEVEL PLAYING FIELD: BARRIERSTOPARTICIPATIONBYFAlTH-BASED 
AND COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS IN FEDERAL SOCIAL SERVICE PROGRAMS 1 (2001), 
available at http://www. whitehouse.gov/news/releasesJ2001l08/200 10816-3-report. pdf. 
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seeking federal program grants.76 In other words, the report charged that federal 
agencies were actively discriminating against religious organizations in the procure-
ment process. The report concluded that federal officials were refusing to collaborate 
with faith-based organizations due to the agency's unwarranted perception that such 
partnerships were "legally suspect.,,77 
Shortly thereafter, several members of the House of Representati ves drafted the 
Community Solutions Act of 200 1, a bill designed to codify the President's expansion 
of charitable choice into more than one hundred programs in fi ve federal agencies.78 
The bill, "seen as the [P]resident' s bill," generated a firestorm of controversy. 79 Oppo-
nents, who emerged from both the political right and left, charged variously that the 
bill would federally fund employment discrimination, funnel money to objection-
able sects, bureaucratize churches, entangle government with religion, and lead to re-
ligious coercion of social service beneficiaries.80 Some evangelical leaders surprised 
the White House with their hostility to the bill.81 In July 2001, further partisanship 
was unleashed when the Washington Post reported that the Salvation Army, one of 
the largest faith-based organizations in the United States, told the White House it 
would lobby Congress in support of the bill if the White House granted it an ex-
emption from state and local laws requiring domestic partner benefits and banning 
hiring discrimination against gays.82 After the story "caused a furor in Washington," 
the White House denied making the commitment and said it would not issue the ex-
emption.83 During this time, House Democrats Robert C. Scott of Virginia and Chet 
Edwards of Texas led a spirited campaign against the legislation and convinced most 
of the Democrats in the House to vote against it.84 Nevertheless, the House narrowly 
passed the Community Solutions Act of 200 1 in July of that year, with some changes 
designed to meet public objections.85 However, the partisanship that accompanied 
passage of the bill through the House eventually doomed it. 86 
76 Id. at 14. 
77 Id. at 10. Some commentators have noted that the report mischaracterized existing agency 
programs and "lacked full scrutiny." FARRIS ET AL., supra note 6, at 7. 
78 H.R. 7, 107th Congo (2001). 
79 See BLACK ET AL., supra note 3, at 208. 
80 See id. 
8l See Thomas B. Edsall, Robertson Joins Liberals in Faulting Bush's 'Faith-Based' Plan, 
WASH. POST, Feb. 22, 2001, at AS; Dana Milbank & Thomas B. Edsall, Faith Initiative May 
Be Revised: Criticism Surprises Administration, WASH. POST, Mar. 12,2001, at Al (noting that 
the White House was surprised by objections from Pat Robertson, Jerry Falwell, Richard Land, 
and even charitable choice architect Marvin Olasky). 
82 See Dana Milbank, Charity Cites Bush Help in Fight Against Hiring Gays: Salvation 
Army Wants Exemptionfrom Laws, WASH. POST, July 10,2001, at AI. 
83 Dana Milbank, Bush Drops Rule on Hiring o/Gays; Democrats: 'Faith-Based'Initiative 
at Risk, WASH. POST, July 10,2001, at AI. 
84 See BLACK ET AL., supra note 3, at 128-29. 
85 See id. at 142. 
86 See id. at 143 (noting ''the partisan push of H.R. 7 through the House cannot be seen as 
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The Senate delayed consideration of the bill for at least a year to work through 
heated public objections.87 In 2001, the Senate held hearings on a narrow charitable 
choice provision that would funnel drug treatment funds to churches.88 Although 
all opposing viewpoints were fully aired, "it was obvious from the tone and proportion 
of witnesses at the hearing that under the new Senate regime charitable choice bills 
were not going to get out of committee, much less be debated on the floor.,,89 Mean-
while, late in 2001, Senators Lieberman and Santorum began to work with the White 
House on compromise legislation called the Charity Aid, Recovery and Empowerment 
Act of 2002 (CARE Act), which focused on improving tax incentives for charitable 
giving rather than on expanding charitable choice.90 Due to the hiring discrimination 
controversy, Senator Lieberman stated that "too many church-state issues [involving 
charitable choice] had not been resolved"; Senator Santorum said it was too much 
of a "hot-button issue.,,91 Yet even without the charitable choice initiative and with 
Republican control regained in the Senate, the Senate was unable to reach a consensus 
on the CARE Act.92 In 2003, the Senate ultimately passed a pared-down version of 
the CARE Act; again, it did not expand charitable choice.93 However, the House and 
the Senate were never able to work out their differences over this comparatively mod-
est piece oflegislation, and it was not enacted.94 Charitable choice is off Congress's 
table for now. 
B. The President Proceeds 
Unable to move his legislation through Congress, President Bush decided to pur-
sue the objectives of the failed Community Solutions Act through the prerogatives 
of his office.95 In December 2002, he announced to a gathering of over one thousand 
religious and charitable leaders in Philadelphia that he was expanding charitable 
choice on his own.96 He explained, 
a success" and worsened relations between the White House, House Republicans, and interest 
groups). In addition, some proponents of charitable choice, including Marvin Olasky, became 
disenchanted by what they saw as a watering down of the charitable choice provisions. See 
FORMICOLA ET AL., supra note 2, at 145-48. 
87 See FORMICOLA ET AL., supra note 2, at 143-49. 
88 See BLACK ET AL., supra note 3, at 157-58. 
89 [d. at 158. 
90 See FORMICOLA ET AL., supra note 2, at 12, 140--42. Other co-sponsors were Senators 
Clinton, Brownback, and Hatch. [d. at 12. 
91 See id. at 134. 
92 See BLACKET AL., supra note 3, at 181-82. 
93 See S. 476, 108th Congo (2003). 
94 See FORMICOLA ET AL., supra note 2, at 13. 
95 /d. 
96 [d. 
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[W]elfare policy will not solve the deepest problems of the 
spirit .... No government policy can put hope in people's 
hearts or a sense of purpose in people's lives. That is done 
when someone, some good soul puts an arm around a neighbor 
and says, "God loves you, and I love you, and you can count on 
us both. ,,97 
One of the CCEOs announced that day created two new satellite faith-based 
offices in the Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the Agency for International 
Development (US AID) and also mandated that the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency permit churches to qualify for disaster aid in the same way as secular non-
profit groupS.98 
The second order, Executive Order 13,279, was entitled Equal Protection of the 
Laws for Faith-Based and Community Organizations, and it declared that the govern-
ment should provide a "level playing field" in federally funded grant programs by 
allowing religious and secular groups to compete for grants.99 The order is similar 
to the PRA' s charitable choice provision. 100 The order prohibits religious grantees 
from discriminating against program beneficiaries on the basis of religion. 101 More-
over, religious groups that receive direct government funding cannot use those funds 
on "inherently religious activities, such as worship, religious instruction, and prose-
lytization," which need to be separated by time or space from the government-funded 
activities.102 At the same time, religious grantees do not need to sacrifice "their inde-
pendence, autonomy, expression, or religious character" when they accept federal 
funds. 103 Accordingly, religious grantees are permitted to discriminate in favor of 
co-religionists in their hiring.104 This latter provision overturns part of a previous 
executive order signed by President Lyndon Johnson that prohibited government 
contractors from discriminating on the basis of race, creed, color, national origin, 
or religion. 105 
In June 2004, President Bush issued yet another executive order, this time add-
ing three more faith-based centers-in the Departments of Commerce and Veterans 
97 FARRIS ET AL., supra note 6, at 5. 
98 Exec. Order No. 13,280,3 C.F.R. 262-64 (2003), reprinted in 5 U.S.c. § 601 (2006). 
99 Exec. Order No. 13,279,3 C.F.R. 258-62 (2003), reprinted in 5 U.S.c. § 601 (2006) 
("[AJII eligible organizations, including faith-based and other community organizations, are 
able to compete on an equal footing for Federal financial assistance .... "). 
100 See PRA, Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 104, 110 Stat. 2105, 2161-63 (1996). 
101 3 C.F.R. 258-62. 
102 Id. at 260. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. at 258-62. 
105 See infra text accompanying notes 260-67. 
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Affairs and the Small Business Administration-bringing the total number of satel-
lite offices to ten. 106 In addition, the faith-based initiative is being implemented at 
other federal agencies not directly addressed by the executive orders, including the 
Corporation for National and Community Service, the Environmental Protection 
Agency, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the National Credit Union Administration, 
the Social Security Administration, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and 
the Federal Home Loan Bank. I07 
Executive orders are only a part of the President's strategy to get out his faith-
based message. Bush has utilized the power of the bully pulpit by giving numerous 
speeches across the country and in major policy addresses sermonizing about the 
need to bring faith-based organizations into the governmental fold.108 The White 
House OFBCI and the satellite offices have also conducted outreach sessions, con-
ferences, and workshops for religious organizations to inform them about available 
grants and how to apply for them. 100 The White House OFBCI has published and dis-
tributed a catalogue of federal grant programs totaling more than $50 billion that are 
open for applications from faith-based groups. 110 Given that the bulk of federal social 
service funds pass to the states for distribution at the state and local levels, federal 
officials have also created materials to educate state and local officials about how 
to partner with faith-based organizations. I I I In addition to the many pamphlets, 
manuals, guidebooks, brochures, videos, powerpoint presentations, and catalogues 
disseminated by federal officials to promote and explain charitable choice, the White 
House and satellite faith-based offices also have a strong presence on the Internet 
providing information and instructions related to their grant programs. 112 Through-
out the government bureaucracy, efforts are designed not simply to level the playing 
field, but to affirmatively reach out to faith-based organizations. 113 For instance, 
grant announcements at all levels of government now explicitly state that faith-
106 Exec. Order No. 13,342,3 C.F.R. 180-82 (2005), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2006). 
107 See FARRIS ET AL., supra note 6, at 51-56. 
108 See FORMICOLA ET AL., supra note 2, at 5. 
109 DA VEDONAlDSON &STANLEyCARlSON-THIEs,AREvoWTIONOFCOMPASSION: FAITH-
BASED GROUPS AS FuI.LP ARTNERS IN FIGHTING AMERICA'S SOCIAL PROBLEMS 73-74 (2003). 
At one session sponsored by the Departments ofJustice and Health and Human Services (HHS), 
a gospel singer and preacher took center stage in proceedings that looked more like a "tent 
revival than a government-sponsored information session." FARRIS ET AL., supra note 6, at 
15. The religious character of the White House conferences is the subject of a lawsuit alleging 
that the conferences violate the Establishment Clause. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc. 
v. Chao, 433 F.3d 989 (7th Cir. 2006), cert. granted, 127 S.Ct. 722 (2006). 
110 FARRIS ET AL., supra note 6, at 15. 
111 See DONAlDSON & CARlSON-THIES, supra note 109, at 77 (noting that the Departments 
of Labor and HHS have produced workshops and presentations to guide state and local 
governments on reaching out to faith-based organizations). 
112 [d. at 74. 
113 See FARRIS ET AL., supra note 6, at 17. 
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based groups are not only eligible to compete for federal grants, but also that they 
are encouraged to apply.114 In essence, there is now a federal procurement policy 
of affirmative action for churches. 115 
With speed not normally associated with the federal bureaucracy, HHS and HUD 
issued four notices of proposed rulemaking within days of the issuance of Executi ve 
Order 13,279.116 The other covered agencies also swiftly conducted notice and com-
ment rulemaking to implement the CCEOs shortly after they were subsumed within 
the faith-based initiative. 117 Notably, unlike the rules that implement the charitable 
choice provisions of the welfare statute, none of the final rules implementing the 
executive orders cite to any statutory authority-and indeed, they cannot. Rather, 
they each cite to the CCEOs as the underlying authority for the regulations. 118 In 
accordance with the notice and comment requirements for informal rulemaking in 
the Administrative Procedures Act, the agencies accepted public comments on the 
proposed rules. 119 Most of the comments were received from public interest or civil 
or religious liberties organizations and were critical of various aspects of the proposed 
114 Id. at 17-18. 
115 See Faith-Based Initiative Moves Forward at Agencies, EXECUTIVE REp. (OMB 
Watch, Wash., D.C.), Nov. 6, 2002, at 1-3, http://www.ombwatch.org/article/artic1eview/ 
1175. The OMB Watch report discusses an attempt by HHS to set aside certain grant funds 
for faith-based organizations.ld. at 3. HHS withdrew those plans when objections arose.ld. 
It also notes that some states, including New Jersey and North Carolina, have established 
separate funding streams targeted to faith-based providers. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 9, 
at 40--41 (asserting that the White House OFBCI's outreach to faith-based organizations is 
"a classic case of affmnative action"). 
116 See IRA C. Lupu & ROBERT W. TUTTIE, ROUNDTABLE ON REUGION & SOC. WELFARE 
POUCY, DEVELOPMENTS IN THE FAITH-BASED AND COMMUNITY INITIATIVES: COMMENTS ON 
NOTICES OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING AND GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS 21 (2003), available at 
http://www.religionandsocialpolicy.org/docsllegal/reports/I-9-2003 _exec_order _analysis.pdf 
[hereinafter DEVELOPMENTS] (''The quick announcement of the four sets of proposed rules 
demonstrates that the agencies of the Executive Branch remain energetically committed to the 
President's Faith-Based and Community Initiative."). 
117 Some agencies issued policy announcements rather than regulations to implement 
the CCEOs. See IRA C. Lupu & ROBERT W. TUTTIE, ROUNDTABLE ON REUGION & SOC. 
WELFARE POUCY, THE STATE OF THE LAW 2003: DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW CONCERNING 
GOVERNMENT PARTNERSHIPS WITH REUGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS 28-53 (2003), available at 
http://www.socialpolicyandreligion.org/docs/legal/reportS/12-2-2003_state_oCthe_law.pdf 
[hereinafter STATE OF THE LAW 2003]. For instance, USDA has issued a list of grants available 
to faith-based organizations, but it did not engage in rulemaking because it had no preexisting 
written policies that conflicted with the CCEOs.ld. at 28-29. 
liS See, e.g., Participation in Education Department Programs by Religious Organizations, 
69 Fed. Reg. 31,708 (June 4, 2004) (stating in the supplement any background information 
that the new regulations "were part of the Department's effort to fulfill its responsibilities" 
under Executive Orders 13,198 and 13,279). 
119 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2006). 
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rules. 120 Nevertheless, with the exception of some technical changes, the proposed 
rules and the final rules are nearly identical. 121 Moreover, many of the implement-
ing rules from the various agencies are indistinguishable from one another (much 
of the language is identical, thereby suggesting a White House hand in their drafting) 
although some of the rules address unique issues raised by certain programs. 122 
The efforts of the White House and the agencies to expand faith-based contracting 
are yielding results. For instance, the White House reported that in 2005, over $2.1 
billion was awarded to faith-based organizations, accounting for 11 % of the total 
funding awarded through 130 programs and 28 program areas. 123 This marked a 38% 
increase in the number of grants awarded since 2003. 124 HHS alone increased the 
amount of funding it gives to faith-based organizations by 64% since 2002,125 although 
it is not clear which of these grants are pursuant to statutory charitable choice provi-
sions and which are attributable to the executive orders. As a result of the President's 
expansion of charitable choice, faith-based organizations are now using federal grants 
to provide a wide array of social programs, including those that engage in abstinence-
only education,126 mentoring for high-risk youths,127 substance abuse treatment, 128 
housing for AIDS patients, 129 housing counseling for minorities, 130 community re-entry 
for inmates,13I drug and alcohol prevention,132 international AIDS prevention, 133 
housing for homeless veterans,134 and emergency food assistance. 135 
120 For the Department of Education's analysis of comments submitted in reference to the 
new regulations issued in response to CCEOs, see, e.g., Participation in Education Department 
Programs by Religious Organizations, 69 Fed. Reg. at 31,712-15. 
121 The comments and resulting rules are described in STATE OF THE LAW 2003, supra note 
117, at 28, 32-33. 
122 ''The new rules have not materially altered the use or understanding of [the Executive 
Order] .... " IRA C. Lupu & ROBERT W. TuTrLE, ROUNDTABlE ON RELIGION & SOC. WELFARE 
POUCY, THE STATE OF THE LAW 2004: PARTNERSHIPS BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND FAITH-
BASEDORGANIZA TIONS 63 (2004), available at http://www.socialpolicyandreligion.orgldocs/ 
legallreports/12-09-2004_state_oCthe_law.pdf [hereinafter STATE OF THE LAW 2004]. 
123 Press Release, White House, Fact Sheet: Compassion in Action: Producing Real 
Results for Americans Most in Need (Mar. 9, 2006), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
news/releases/2006/03/printl20060309-3.html [hereinafter Compassion in Action]. 
124 [d. 
125 [d. 
126 See FARRIS ET AL., supra note 6, at 23. 
127 /d. at 23-24. 
128 [d. at 26, 40. 
129 [d. at 30. 
130 [d. at 32. 
131 [d. at 40. 
132 [d. 
133 [d. at 41-43. 
134 [d. at 47-48. 
135 [d. at 44-45. 
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C. Courts Contemplate 
Charitable choice grantees walk a perilous "constitutional tightrope" that attempts 
to balance neutrality and religiosity.136 On the one hand, their effectiveness suppos-
edly divines from their overtly spiritual approach. On the other hand, they are not 
supposed to use their charitable choice funds for "inherently religious" activities, in-
cluding proselytizing and worship and logically extending to any activity with re-
ligious content. 137 As one commentator has described this tension, "[iJf houses of 
worship are asked to perform acts of charity without communicating the underlying 
message of faith which inspires them, the act loses much of its life-changing impact. 
But if the religious message accompanies the acts ... then the most basic aspects of 
the Establishment Clause are irnplicated.,,138 As a result of charitable choice's mixed 
messages, "a beneficiary may well end up receiving services from an organization 
with religious symbols on the walls, a discriminatory hiring policy, and required 
prayer led by an employee whose position is funded by private dollars." 139 Moreover, 
unlike the charitable choice legislation, the CCEOs do not require that beneficiaries 
uncomfortable with a religious approach be provided with a secular alternative, and 
this omission heightens potential beneficiary coercion in violation of the Establish-
ment Clause. 
Recent cases bear out this concern and suggest that the tensions within chari-
table choice may not be only irreconcilable, but can also result in interference with 
the civil liberties of beneficiaries. Under current Supreme Court case law, govern-
ment aid provided on a neutral basis to secular and sectarian organizations does not 
violate the Establishment Clause, yet actual diversion of government aid to religious 
indoctrination does. 140 Accordingly, charitable choice programs tend to run into con-
stitutional trouble when they push overtly religious messages that could coerce vulner-
able populations, particularly prisoners and children. The overt religious content in 
many of the challenged programs not only threatens the free exercise rights of pro-
gram beneficiaries, but also can amount to a government endorsement of religion 
in violation of the Establishment Clause. 
For instance, a major recent opinion comes from Iowa, where Americans United 
for Separation of Church and State challenged the InnerChange Freedom Initiative 
(InnerChange), a pre-release prison program at the Newton Correctional Facility 
136 See Conkle, supra note 67, at 248. 
137 Ira Lupu and Robert Tuttle explain the meaning of "inherently religious" and the 
confusion the agency charitable choice rules are causing in using that term. See Lupu & 
Tuttle, supra note 9, at 78-89. 
138 Derek Davis, Right Motive, Wrong Method: Thoughts on the Constitutionality of 
Charitable Choice, in WELFARE REFORM & FAITH-BASED ORGANIZATIONS 267, 291 (Derek 
Davis & Barry Hankins eds., 1999). 
139 See Gilman, supra note 8, at 869. 
140 Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000). 
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designed to rehabilitate inmates and reduce recidivism. 141 After a lengthy trial, the 
United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa held that the program 
was unlawful, and the court not only enjoined the program, but also ordered that 
InnerChange repay the state of Iowa over $1.5 million in spent funds. 142 The court 
found that program participants were required to spend hours each day engaging in 
Bible study, as well as to attend daily religious devotional practice, worship services, 
and weekly revivals. '43 In addition, InnerChange taught inmates that criminal be-
havior is a sin, which can only be remedied "through a miraculous delivery by God-
specifically, God in ChriSt."I44 The court found further that the religious nature of 
the program precluded non-Evangelical Christian inmates from participating. 145 The 
Court stated, "[t]he overtly religious atmosphere of the InnerChange program is not 
simply an overlay or a secondary effect of the program-it is the program."I46 Thus, 
"[fJor all practical purposes, the state has literally established an Evangelical Christian 
congregation within the walls of one its penal institutions, giving the leaders of that 
congregation, i.e., InnerChange employees, authority to control the spiritual, emo-
tional, and physical lives of hundreds oflowa inmates."147 These actions constituted 
"severe" violations of the Establishment Clause, resulting in unlawful promotion 
of religion, incentives for inmates to engage in religious observance, and govern-
ment financial support for religious indoctrination. 148 
There are also a series of cases challenging charitable choice programs that in-
volve children. For example, the ACLU settled a case with the Department of Health 
and Human Services that challenged a one million dollar grant to a sexual abstinence 
program called the Silver Ring Thing (SRT).'49 SRT held high-tech multimedia shows 
where members testified about how Jesus Christ improved their lives, quoted Bible 
passages, and urged teenagers to commit their lives to Jesus Christ and to purchase 
141 Ams. United for Separation of Church & State v. Prison Fellowship Ministries, 432 
F. Supp. 2d 862 (S.D. Iowa 2006). 
142 /d. at 941. 
143 Id. at 901-03. 
144 Id. at 875. 
145 Id. at 898-99. 
146 Id. at 922. 
147 Id. at 933. 
148 Id. at 939. In a similar case involving a prison program in Pennsylvania, a federal district 
court judge rejected a series of motions to dismiss a lawsuit that challenged government wel-
fare grants to the Firm Foundation, a vocational training program and self-described "prison 
ministry" for inmates. Moeller v. Bradford, 444 F. Supp. 2d 316 (M.D. Pa. 2006); Moeller 
v. Bradford County, No. 3:05CU334, 2006 WL 319288 (M.D. Pa., Feb. 10,2006). The court 
found that the program required staff to adhere to Christian beliefs, actively proselytized in-
mates, and did not segregate government funds for secular purposes. Moeller, 444 F. Supp. 
2d at 318. The plaintiffs contended that such a program violated the Establishment Clause. Id. 
149 See Raja Misha, U.S. to End Funding of Abstinence Program, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 
24, 2006, at B4. 
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rings that were inscribed with New Testament verse. 150 In the settlement, HHS ended 
funding for the program as it is currently structured, made future funds contingent 
on the Silver Ring Thing's compliance with charitable choice restrictions, and agreed 
to closely monitor any future grants to the program. 151 The settlement agreement also 
incorporated a list of safeguards that HHS would impose on any future grants with 
SRT; this document "represent[ed] the clearest and most complete legal guidance 
for faith-based grantees that has thus far been produced" by the government. 152 HHS 
terminated its grant to SRT in January 2006, and the SRT is not currently receiving 
funds from HHS.153 
In addition, conflicts over hiring discrimination are also rising to the fore. Title 
vn exempts private religious organizations from the general ban on religious discrimi-
nation in hiring. 154 The exemption applies to all employees, not just those in minis-
terial positions. 155 In Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 156 the Supreme Court upheld the exemption in 
a case involving employees of the Mormon Church who worked in secular positions, 
reasoning that the exemption alleviated governmental interference with the ability 
of religious organizations to carry out their missions. 157 The question remains post-
Amos whether the exemption applies to religious organizations that receive government 
funds although most lower federal courts that have addressed the issue concluded that 
it does. 158 The issue is further complicated because many states and localities do not 
150 See Frank James, Faith-Based Organizations Face Suits-Groups Using Federal Funds 
Are Accused of Proselytizing, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 2, 2006, at 8. 
151 [d. 
152 IRA Lupu & ROBERT TUTILE, ROUNDTABLE ON REUGION & SOc. WELFARE POUCY, 
THE STATE OF THE LAW 2006: LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING PARTNERSHIPS BETWEEN 
GOVERNMENT AND FAITH BASED ORGANIZATIONS, at iii (2006), available at http://www 
.religionandsocialpolicy.orgidocs/legaI/reports/State_oCthe_Law_2006.pdf. 
153 [d. at 3. For another case involving an abstinence program, see ACLV v. Foster, No. 
Civ.A. 02-1440,2002 WL 1733651, at *3-6 (E.D. La. 2002). There, a federal district court 
in Louisiana enjoined a state funding program for abstinence education that gave grants to 
a variety of groups that spent money to support prayer at pro-life marches and rallies; taught 
participants about '''the virgin birth and .... God's desire [for] sexual purity as a way of 
life"'; conducted public school skits that made statements "about what God and the Bible say 
about abstinence"; and gave engraved Bibles to children. [d. The court concluded that state 
money was "being used to convey religious messages and advance religion," id. at *7, and 
ordered the state to implement safeguards that would prevent government abstinence funds 
from being used for religious purposes. [d. at *6-8. 
154 42 V.S.c. § 2000e-1(a) (2000) ("This subchapter shall not apply ... to a religious 
corporation, association, educational institution, or society with respect to the employment 
of individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such 
corporation, association, educational institution, or society of its activities."). 
155 [d. 
156 483 V.S. 327 (1987). 
157 [d. at 330, 336, 339. 
158 See, e.g., Hall v. Baptist Mem'l Health Care Corp., 215 F.3d 618, 625 (6th Cir. 2000) 
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exempt publicly funded religious organizations from nondiscrimination laws. 159 It 
is unclear whether charitable choice statutes or the CCEOs preempt these provisions, 
and scholars are heatedly debating this issue. 160 
Meanwhile, the case law is developing. A court decision favorable to charitable 
choice policies was issued in Lown v. Salvation Anny, 161 in which a group of current 
and former employees of the Salvation Army brought suit against the Salvation Army 
as well as government agencies that contracted with the organization, alleging that 
they were forced out of their jobs when they refused to sign a form affirming the 
Salvation Army's religious mission and requiring that they identify their religious 
affiliation as well as list all the churches they attended in the past ten years. 162 The 
district court judge held that the Salvation Army could maintain faith-selective em-
ployment policies 163 and that it was not a state actor subject to the Equal Protection 
Clause. l64 At the same time, the court did not dismiss the plaintiff s claims that the 
Salvation Army was violating the Establishment Clause by using government funds 
to implement a plan to infuse Salvation Army programs with religious content and 
by using ten percent of its government funding as a tithe to serve religious purposes. 165 
Such litigation is likely to flourish, along with the expansion of charitable choice as 
the government and grantees struggle to capture the benefits of spirituality without 
funding activities that are "inherently religious.,,166 
II. GAP-FILLING OR LAWMAKING? 
With each new occupant in the White House, we have come to expect the whip-
lash of policy reversals as each President puts his own stamp on the activities of the 
executive branch. For instance, the Reagan Administration implemented a regulation 
forbidding family planning clinics that receive federal funds from counseling patients 
(finding that the Baptist Memorial College of Health Sciences did not waive its exemption 
by receipt of federal funds). For a compelling argument that the exemption should not apply 
in the context of charitable choice, see Steven K. Green, Religious Discrimination, Public 
Funding, and Constitutional Values, 30 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1 (2002). 
159 See Melissa McClellan, Note, Faith and Federalism: Do Charitable Choice Provisions 
Preempt State Nondiscrimination Employment Laws?, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1437, 
1451-52 (2004). 
160 See id. at 1443-44 (summarizing contrary positions). 
161 393 F. Supp. 2d 223 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
162 /d. at 226,231-33. 
163 [d. at 246-52. 
164 [d. at 235-37. 
165 /d. at 239-41. 
166 For an updated, comprehensive listing of charitable choice litigation, including pending 
and settled cases, see The Roundtable on Religion and Social Welfare Policy, Legal Updates, 
http://www.religionandsocialpolicy.orgllegal/legal_updates.cfm (last visited Apr. 24, 2007). 
1124 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 15: 1103 
about abortion. 167 The Supreme Court upheld this "gag rule" against attack during 
the Bush Administration. 168 Making good on a widely-touted campaign promise, 
President Clinton reversed the "gag rule.,,169 President Bush, in turn, reinstated part 
of it. 170 Likewise, President Bush's successor can always revoke the faith-based 
executive orders and reinstate requirements that social welfare funds flow only to 
secular providers. We tolerate these flip-flops in line with the realities of the modern 
administrative state. Congress is not able to legislate with specificity due to a combi-
nation of factors including unforeseen circumstances, the imprecision of language, 
the complexity of modern society, the need for technical expertise in policymaking, 
and, more often than not, a lack of political Will.171 Therefore, Congress delegates im-
plementation of statutes to the executive branch. In turn, the courts generally uphold 
these broad delegations, as well as the agency policies carrying them out. 172 
For instance, when it upheld the Reagan and Bush I "gag rule" in Rust v. Sullivan, 
the Supreme Court stated that although the scope of Congress's ban on funding 
"methods of family planning" was ambiguous, the regulatory interpretation of that 
phrase to include a ban on abortion counseling activities was permissible and entitled 
to Chevron deference. 173 Under the Chevron doctrine, courts defer to reasonable 
agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes. 174 Rust thus exemplifies the principle 
that the executive branch can fill in gaps where a statute is silent or ambiguous. 175 Of 
course, gap-filling can only happen where there is an underlying statute delegating 
interpretive authority to an agency. 176 
167 See Separation of Abortion Related Services from Family Planning Programs, 52 Fed. 
Reg. 33,214-15 (Sept. 1, 1987). 
168 Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 177-79 (1991) (holding that the provisions of Title X 
that prohibit clinics receiving funding under Title X from providing abortion counseling do 
not violate the First Amendment). 
169 See The Title X Gag Rule, 58 Fed. Reg. 7455 (Jan. 22, 1993); see also LoUIS FISHER & 
NEAL DEVINS , POLlTICALDYNAMICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LA w 204 (2d ed. 1996) ("[T]wo days 
after his inauguration, Clinton dismantled the pro-life regulatory initiatives of the Reagan and 
Bush administrations."). 
170 Press Release, White House, Memorandum: Restoration of the Mexico City Policy 
(Jan. 22, 2001) (reinstating President Reagan's "Mexico City" gag order on foreign family 
planning clinics that receive U.S. aid). 
171 See RICHARDJ. PIERCEET AL.,ADMINISTRATIVELAW AND PROCESS 43-44 (4thed. 2004). 
172 See id. at 53-54. 
173 Rust, 500 U.S. at 181-82,184,186-87. 
174 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,843-44 (1984). 
175 See Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of Presidential Lawmaking, 61 
U. CHI. L. REv. 123, 183 (1994) (discussing Presidential gap-filling in the context of the 
abortion "gag rule"); Monaghan, supra note 16, at 59. 
176 Greene, supra note 175, at 183 ("Thus, it is well accepted that the Court may allow the 
executive branch to resolve statutory ambiguities, flesh out statutory vagueness, and fill in 
statutory gaps-all of which are interpretive lawmaking functions."). 
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In the absence of such a statute or an express constitutional grant of executive 
authority, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer 177 teaches that an executive who 
engages in policy-making may stray into lawmaking, which is an impermissible 
aggrandizement of power to the executive. 178 Yet the distinction between gap-
filling and lawmaking is difficult to pinpoint; it is so difficult, in fact, that the courts 
have largely left it to the executive branch to draw the line itself.179 Under both 
Youngstown and Chevron, locating congressional intent is paramount. Youngstown 
tells us when a President can act; Chevron tells us how much deference to afford 
executi ve action. This Part explores whether the charitable choice orders constitute 
gap-filling or lawmaking, and it concludes that there is no statutory delegation to 
the President to implement charitable choice. 
A. Youngstown and the Search for Delegated Authority 
Charitable choice legislation is found in the Personal Responsibility Actl80 as 
well as in a handful of other statutes involving discrete social service programs. 181 
While there are questions about the constitutionality of these provisions due to the 
church-state entanglements they create,182 there is no doubt that these provisions 
represent the will of Congress. By contrast, Congress has repeatedly failed to enact 
proposed expansions of charitable choice into the programs covered by President 
Bush's faith-based executive orders. 183 Thus, CCEOs appear contrary to the will 
of Congress; that is, Congress thought about and fought over these expansions, and 
proponents ultimately could not muster enough votes to put them into effect. 
A similar expression of congressional will was determinative in Youngstown 
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,l84 a case getting renewed scrutiny in the aftermath of 
President Bush's exercises of his alleged war powers. Youngstown "is the routine 
starting point in decisions dealing with challenges to presidential power." 185 There, 
President Truman ordered the Secretary of Commerce to seize U.S. steel mills so 
177 343 u.s. 579 (1952). 
178 /d. at 587-88. 
179 See Kevin M. Stack, The Statutory President, 90 IOWA L. REv. 539,561 (2005) ("In 
decisions that review the president's actions to determine whether they exceed the authority 
granted by statute, courts generally have treated the president's assertions of statutory 
authority with 'deference and restraint.' But they have not settled on the character or scope 
of this deference."). 
180 42 U.S.c. § 604(a) (2001). 
181 JOE RICHARDSON, CONGo REsEARCH SERV., CHARITABLE CHOICE RULES AND FAITH-
BASED ORGANIZATIONS 2 (2006), available at http://bartlett.house.gov/uploadedfiles/ 
Faith%20Based.pdf. 
182 See supra note 9. 
183 RICHARDSON, supra note 181, at 2. 
184 343 u.S. 579 (1952). 
185 See Stack, supra note 179, at 557. 
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that an impending strike would not hobble steel production during the Korean 
War. 186 Prior to Truman's seizure, Congress had considered but rejected granting 
President Truman the very emergency seizure powers that he later exercised. 187 
Although the case produced seven decisions by the Court, all the Justices agreed on 
the principle that the President's power to issue the seizure order must stem from 
either the Constitution or an enacted statute; where the Justices disagreed was 
whether such authority existed in the case before it. 188 Justice Black, writing for the 
court, held that there was neither a statute authorizing the seizure nor constitutional 
authority to support it. 189 Thus, the President's action was illegal. 190 As he stated, 
"the President's power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea 
that he is to be a lawmaker.,,191 
In his influential concurrence, Justice Jackson identified three "somewhat over-
simplified" categories of presidential action that reflect a more fluid conception of 
presidential power. 192 Justice Jackson stressed that "[p]residential powers are not 
fixed but fluctuate, depending upon their disjunction or conjunction with those of 
Congress."193 A President's authority is at its utmost when he acts pursuant to 
express or implied statutory authority. 194 By contrast, his authority is "at its lowest 
ebb" where his actions contradict Congress's Will. 195 In such a case, the President 
acts lawfully only if the Constitution grants him exclusive power that is beyond 
Congress's power to limit. 196 Between these two extremes, there is a "zone of 
twilight" in which the President can act where Congress has been silent. 197 In such 
a case, the President and Congress may have concurrent authority, and the President 
"can only rely upon his own independent powers." 198 Justice Jackson commented 
that in the zone of twilight, "any actual test of power is likely to depend on the 
imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract 
theories of law.,,199 Applying this framework to Truman's steel seizure, Justice 
Jackson concluded that the President acted in derogation of congressional will, as 
expressed by Congress's enactment of at least three alternative statutory procedures 
186 Youngstown, 343 u.s. at 582. 
187 !d. at 586. 
188 See id. at 667 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting). 
189 [d. at 585, 587 (majority opinion). 
190 [d. at 589. 
191 !d. at 587. 
192 [d. at 635-38 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
193 [d. at 635. 
194 [d. at 635-37. 
195 [d. at 637-38. 
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for seizing private property that Truman failed to utilize and by Congress's failure 
to enact authorizing legislation.2°O Conversely, the dissenters concluded that not 
only was there no statute expressly prohibiting Truman's actions, but also that the 
objectives of existing national defense and procurement statutes could not be 
effectuated without continued operation of the steel millS.201 
The parallels between the steel seizure order and the CCEOs are obvious. Both 
presidential policies were implemented after Congress failed to enact nearly 
identical legislation that would have accomplished the same objectives. The 
rejected legislative proposal in Youngstown influenced at least five of the Justices, 
who felt it reflected congressional opposition to Truman's action.202 Similarly, one 
could argue that the CCEOs fall into Justice Jackson's third category: for executive 
action that is taken contrary to congressional will on an issue that is not within the 
President's exclusive constitutional purview. The President clearly does not have 
the exclusive power to establish domestic policy (even his inherent power is 
questionable);203 the focus must be discerning congressional intent. 
Thus, the President would need to search for statutes that delegate discretion to 
the executive to make faith-based policy choices. By jumping into Youngstown's 
first category-where the President has implied or express statutory 
authority204-the President might also gamer Chevron deference.2os It is an open 
question whether Chevron deference, available to agency interpretations of statutes, 
extends to presidential interpretations. It is also debatable whether a statute that 
gives policy-making discretion to an agency permits the President to step in and 
direct agencies to implement his own desired outcome. In other words, there may 
be a legal consequence to the fact that charitable choice emanates from the 
President rather than from the agencies. 
Putting these questions aside for now, a likely presidential argument would go 
as follows. The hundreds of human services statutes covered by the CCEOs are 
silent or ambiguous as to who is eligible to receive grants. Thus, there is a statutory 
ambiguity available to be filled. Moreover, the constitutional law in this area has 
moved from strict separationism to increased tolerance of government programs that 
fund religious groups for educational and social services. Accordingly, the 
President-who is in the best institutional position to conform agency conduct to 
legal changes-is simply shifting agency policy to adapt to changing constitutional 
200 [d. at 640-55; see also Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686 (1981) (applying 
the Youngstown framework to hold that the President could suspend claims against Iran based 
on "inferences to be drawn from the character of the legislation Congress has enacted in the 
area ... and from the history of acquiescence in executive claims settlement"). 
201 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 667-710 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting). 
202 See generally id. 
203 [d. at 587-88 (majority opinion). 
204 [d. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
205 Chevron U.S.A, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984). 
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circumstances. Further, because there is a gap, the agencies' new regulations imple-
menting charitable choice are worthy of Chevron deference, and since they are reason-
able, they should be upheld. In sum, if there is a statutory delegation, the President 
is on much firmer ground; he becomes a gap-filler rather than a lawmaker. Notably, 
the President has not made the argument outlined above. To the contrary, he has cited 
to no statutory or constitutional authority for the orders, and he has not been chal-
lenged for his failure to do so. 
B. The Sounds of Silence in Human Services Statutes 
The CCEOs affect hundreds of human services statutes that neither expressly 
permit nor prohibit charitable choice. The question thus arises whether this silence 
amounts to a gap. Examples of these statutes are helpful in answering this question. 
For instance, under the statute creating the Public Awareness in Underserved Com-
munities demonstration projects,206 the Department of Justice is authorized to make 
grants to organizations to raise the awareness of underserved populations, particularly 
socially isolated immigrant communities, about victims' rights and how to access 
crime victim services. 2m Eligible victim assistance programs include a "public agency 
or a nonprofit organization" that meet certain statutory requirements designed to 
ensure program effectiveness.208 The statute was enacted in 1984 as part of the 
Comprehensive Crime Control Act,209long before grants to pervasively sectarian 
organizations were considered permissible. In 2006, $350,000 was available for 
these demonstration projects,2IO and faith-based partnerships received "[f1avorable 
consideration. ,,211 President Bush might argue that the statute, allowing the Secretary 
to make grants to educate communities of limited-English speakers about their rights 
as crime victims, is silent as to who is eligible to receive grants. As a result, the argu-
ment goes, the executive branch has the authority to fill that gap and to conclude 
that faith-based providers should be included as potential grantees. 
Another example of this sort of statute is the HUD-administered Housing 
Opportunities for Persons with AIDS (HOPW A), which is designed to provide hous-
ing assistance and related supportive services for low-income people with HN / AIDS 
and their farnilies.212 Grantees of HOPWA funds can engage in activities including 
206 42 U.S.c. § 10603(c)(1)(A) (2000). 
207 U.S. Dep't of Justice, Grant Announcement for Public Awareness in Underserved 
Communities 3, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/fund/pdftextIFY06_UnderservedAwareness.pdf 
(last visited Apr. 242007) [hereinafter Grant Announcement]. 
208 42 U.S.c. § 10603(b)(1) (2000). 
209 Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473,98 Stat. 1976 (1984) 
(codified at 42 U.S.c. § 10603 (2000)). 
210 Grant Announcement, supra note 207, at 4. 
211 [d. at 3. 
212 42 U.S.c. §§ 12,901-12 (2000). 
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housing information services;213 resource identification;214 project or tenant-based 
rental assistance;215 short-term rent, mortgage, and utility payments to prevent home-
lessness;216 housing and development operations;217 and supportive services.218 The 
Secretary is authorized to make grants to states, cities, and nonprofit organiza-
tions.219 In 2003, over one-third of the organizations that received HOPWA funding 
were faith-based although it is not clear how many would fit within the pervasively 
sectarian label.220 Here too, Bush might argue that he interprets the term "non-profit" 
to include religious organizations, and this is a reasonable interpretation subject to 
Chevron deference.221 
These are only two examples of the statutes covered by the CCEOs. Yet the gap-
filling rationale, used successfully in Rust v. Sullivan,222 is misplaced in this context. 
Chevron permits deference where there is an interpretive act from an agency (and 
maybe the President) construing a particular statute.223 But President Bush is not 
really analyzing the statutory text and gap-filling hundreds of silent statutes. Neither 
he nor his advisors have looked at each statute to make a considered policy or inter-
pretive decision as to each one, and such an approach would be foolish for imple-
menting a whole-scale, government-wide program. For their part, the agencies have 
not conducted interpretations of the statutes they administer to determine if they 
contain ambiguity. President Bush is regulating across a broad field oflegislation and 
mandating a policy preference for sectarian involvement in social services for any 
statutory program that does not expressly direct otherwise. Not surprisingly, the 
affected statutes do not provide "otherwise"; the vast majority was enacted at a time 
when government funding to sectarian groups was deemed unconstitutional by all 
three branches of government. 224 Thus, there really is no "gap" to fill. 
For instance, the term "nonprofit organization" in HOPW A is not further de-
fined;225 however, the term does not automatically encompass churches. As a matter 
of tax law as well as the Religion Clause of the First Amendment, churches are subject 
to differing rules and standards than other nonprofits and accordingly, are referred 
213 Id. § 12,906(1). 
214 Id. § 12,906(2). 
215 Id. § 12,907(a)(1). 
216 /d. § 12,907(a)(2). 
217 /d. § 12,907(a)(4). 
218 /d. § 12,907(a)(3). 
219 /d. § 12,903. 
220 See FARRIS ET AL., supra note 6, at 30. 
221 Under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 
(1984), courts must defer to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes. 
222 500 U.S. 173, 184-87 (1991). 
223 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-45. 
224 See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text. 
225 42 U.S.c. § 12,902(13) (2000). 
1130 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 15:1103 
to in statutes and case law with distinctive terminology.226 Moreover, when the 
HOPWA statute was passed in 1992, the clear understanding was that pervasively 
sectarian organizations were not eligible to apply for federal grants.227 Thus, 
Congress's silence on faith-based funding embodied a constitutional prohibition on 
funding "pervasively sectarian" organizations that became part of the fabric of these 
statutes. If Congress wanted to promote faith-based funding of sectarian groups when 
most of these statutes were enacted, it could not. If it wanted to prohibit faith-based 
funding, such action was not necessary. In other words, Congress did not prohibit 
faith-based funding because the Supreme Court already did. Thus, the CCEOs cannot 
fairly be considered exercises in gap-filling because there is no "gap" to fill. In this 
case, silence spoke volumes. 
Moreover, Congress--or at least some of its members-has been well aware of 
the shifting landscape of constitutional doctrine in this area. In 1996, Congress en-
acted charitable choice into the welfare reform statute and expressly added charitable 
choice to several other pieces of legislation.228 In other words, when Congress wants 
to use faith-based contracting, it knows how to do so. This further suggests that 
"silence" does not always create a gap. Indeed, because the issue was effectively 
closed at the time of the statutory enactments, none of the three types of statutory 
gaps identified in Chevron apply to these human services statutes, such as when 
Congress has failed to consider a question,229 is "unable to forge a coalition,,,23o or 
consciously delegated discretion to the agency.231 To the contrary, when Congress 
has expressly considered the charitable choice issue, it has either chosen to enact 
such policies or not. 
Recently, the Supreme Court struck an interpretive rule issued by Attorney 
General Ashcroft that made physician use of a controlled substance to assist suicide 
illegal, holding that the rule was not authorized by the underlying statute.232 The 
Court concluded that the Attorney General acted outside the scope of the specific stat-
utory delegation, noting "[t]he importance of the issue of physician-assisted suicide, 
which has been the subject of an 'earnest and profound debate' across the country ... 
makes the oblique form of the claimed delegation all the more suspect.,,233 Likewise, 
charitable choice has been a subject of high-profile political debate and popular inter-
est, making it unlikely that Congress would "'delegate a decision of such economic 
and political significance to an agency in so cryptic a fashion. ",234 
226 See, e.g., Gilman, supra note 8, at 836-43 (discussing the different accountability mech-
anisms that apply to religious organizations as opposed to other nonprofit organizations). 
227 See, e.g., FARRIS ET AL., supra note 6, at 29. 
228 RICHARDSON, supra note 181, at 2. 
229 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984). 
230 Id. 
231 Id. 
232 Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 921 (2006). 
233 Id. 
234 Id. (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120,160 (2000». 
2007] PRESIDENT BUSH AND THE EXPANSION OF CHARITABLE CHOICE 1131 
It could be that Congress simply wants human services contracting to be as broad 
as the Constitution pennits. That is, it does not have to legislate specifically in this 
area because agencies will follow constitutional boundaries. Yet just because faith-
based contracting is pennissible does not mean that Congress has delegated the policy 
choice to agencies. Indeed, the legislative history of the failed charitable choice legis-
lation, which is far more specific than any supposed gap in the human services statutes, 
belies this idea. These non-enactments demonstrate Congress's intent that chari-
table choice not be expanded to the programs covered by the CCEOs. This is another 
form of congressional inaction-that which emanates from non-enacted proposals. 
To be sure, relying on the rejected proposal as an expression of congressional intent 
might read more into Congress's actions than some Justices might be willing to do. 
A textualist interpreter would likely argue that congressional silence is not a con-
stitutionally permissible way to legislate. As the argument goes, Congress speaks au-
thoritatively only when both houses pass legislation that is then either signed by the 
President or upheld over his veto by a two-thirds vote.235 A non-enactrnent is not the 
same as a prohibition-which Congress could pass if it wanted to.236 This argument 
begs the question as to why Congress would have passed a statute prohibiting char-
itable choice in the first place; as Congress generally passes statutes to effectuate 
policies, not to prohibit non-existent policies. 
Moreover, requiring Congress to serve as an active check on presidential over-
reaching is not realistic or desirable, given Congress's institutional constraints and the 
collective action problems that beset it.237 As political scientists Terry Moe and William 
Howell explain: Congress, constituted by hundreds of members each beholden to dif-
ferent bounded constituencies, faces immense transaction costs to overturn presiden-
tial action.238 Because members of Congress must please their constituencies in order 
to win reelection, they have little institutional motivation to reign in presidential 
power by promoting congressional power as an end to itself.239 Even if Congress 
wanted to check presidential overreaching, congressional action faces a "maze of ob-
stacles," as bills must work their way through multiple committees, subcommittees, 
floor votes in the House and Senate, and intense negotiations to reach a form agree-
able in both houses-all the while fending off attacks by party leaders, rules com-
mittees, filibusters, holds, and other procedural roadblocks.240 
235 See Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 671-72 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
("[O]ne must ignore rudimentary principles of political science to draw any conclusions re-
garding that [congressional] intent from the failure to enact legislation .... [W]e should admit 
that vindication by congressional inaction is a canard."). 
236 See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Youngstown Goes to War, 19 CaNST. COMMENT. 215, 
234-35 (2002). 
237 See Terry M. Moe & William G. Howell, The Presidential Power of Unilateral Action, 
15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 132, 133 (1999); Stack, supra note 179, at 579-81. 
238 See Moe & Howell, supra note 237, at 144. 
239 See id. (noting the dilemma for the member of Congress becomes a prisoner's dilemma). 
240 See id. at 146. 
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[C]oalitions [must] somehow be formed among hundreds oflegis-
lators across two houses and a variety of committees, which calls 
for intricate coordination, persuasion, trades, promises, and all 
the rest, but owing to scarce time and resources, members must 
also be convinced that the issue at hand is more deserving than 
the hundreds of other issues competing for their attention.241 
Not surprisingly, Congress rarely attempts to overturn executive orders, and when it 
does, it is rarely successful.242 
In the case of charitable choice, expecting a congressional response is unrealistic 
and unnecessary. This is not a case where the meaning of congressional silence is 
elusive, such as where Congress pays little attention to a proposed bill. In the case 
of charitable choice, both houses of Congress debated the legislation extensively for 
two years, the media actively covered the debate, and despite all the attention, the 
Senate could not bring the bill to a vote due to substantive opposition to the bill's 
goalS.243 As Justice O'Connor stated in FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co. ,244 
in concluding that congressional inaction can reveal legislative intent, "'[i]t is hardly 
conceivable that Congress-and in this setting, any Member of Congress-was not 
abundantly aware of what was going on. ",245 In Brown & Williamson, the Court struck 
down a Clinton administration regulation in which the FDA asserted jurisdiction to 
regulate tobacco.246 As Justice O'Connor recognized, not all congressional inaction 
is the same, and some is highly indicative of congressional intent.247 The Court-as 
in the subsequent Gonzales v. Oregon case-refused to presume that Congress dele-
gates power to the executive branch to fill statutory gaps in cases involving highly 
controversial issues.248 Her majority opinion, joined by proclaimed textualists such 
as Justices Scalia and Thomas, relied on numerous indicia of congressional intent 
regarding tobacco regulation in the absence of a clear statutory command, including 
rejected bills, related statutes, and years oflegislative acquiescence to prior agency 
interpretations.249 
241 /d. 
242 Id. at 165-66. Moe and Howell note that members of Congress proposed legislation 
to overturn a scant 37 out of 1,000executive orders between 1973 and 1997; of these 
attempts, only three succeeded./d. However, most executive orders are not controversial; they 
deal with internal government affairs. Thus, these statistics may overstate the extent of both 
presidential overreaching and congressional acquiescence. 
243 See supra notes 78-94 and accompanying text. 
244 529 U.S. 120 (2000). 
245 Id. at 156 (quoting Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 600--01 (1983». 
246 /d. at 161. 
247 /d. at 155-56. 
248 Id. at 159--60. 
249 Id. at 143-59. 
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Yet, relying on a failure to enact might also open up an invitation to look at 
Congress's intent since implementation of the CCEOs. Congress has not subsequently 
passed legislation overruling the President, and it has continued appropriating funds 
for the affected social programs. Thus, Congress might be viewed as acquiescing in 
the President's approach. Acquiescence is another controversial, but widely used, 
method of statutory interpretation that textualists disavow. 250 The acquiescence argu-
ment seems weak, given that overruling presidential action is institutionally difficult 
for Congress and that stripping funds from programs that serve desperately needy 
people is an undesirable way to teach the President a lesson. However, it is difficult 
to predict how the Court might read these scattered tea leaves. For the reasons sug-
gested above, the Court has been maddeningly inconsistent in how much interpre-
tive weight rejected proposals, acquiescence, and congressional silence can bear.251 
Nevertheless, Youngstown provides one way out of the thicket. In particular, 
Youngstown teaches that congressional inaction can shed light on sweeping assertions 
of presidential power in contexts involving controversial issues where congressional 
competencies are highest.252 As in Youngstown, there is no statutory gap here to be 
filled. At the same time, there is ample evidence that the President's orders, particu-
larly the employment discrimination provisions, are contrary to congressional intent, 
as expressed in the non-enactment of the President's proposed bills. As a result, the 
President will need to point to other sources of statutory authority as well as his con-
stitutional powers in the "zone of twilight" as hooks upon which to hang his chari-
table choice hat. 
C. The Executive Role in Federal Procurement 
Another possible hook for the President is to rely on his long-standing role as the 
head offederal procurement policies. As noted earlier, most of Bush's faith-based 
executive orders do not cite to any specific statutory or constitutional authority.253 
Rather, they state simply that they are being promulgated, "[b]y the authority vested 
in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America."254 
250 Compare Cent. Bank of Denver v. Pirst Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 185-88 
(1994) (rejecting acquiescence arguments), with Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 
574,599-602 (1983) (describing how Congress acquiesced in an IRS revenue ruling pro-
hibiting tax-exempt status to schools that discriminate on the basis of race). 
251 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REv. 67 
(1988). 
252 With regard to legislative competencies involving issues of religious liberty, see infra 
Part III. 
253 See supra Part LB. 
254 Exec. Order No. 13,342,3 c.P.R. 180-82 (2005), reprinted in 5 U .S.c. § 601 (2006); 
Exec. Order No. 13,331, 3 c.P.R. 146-48 (2005), reprinted in 42 U.S.c. § 12,501 (2006); 
Exec. Order No. 13,280,3 C.F.R. 262-64 (2003), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2006); Exec. 
Order No. 13,199,3 C.P.R. 752-54 (2002), reprinted in 3 U.S.C. ch. 2 (2006); Exec. Order 
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However, in Executive Order 13,279, which mandates equal protection for faith-based 
organizations,255 President Bush expressly cites the Federal Property and Adminis-
trative Services Act of 1949 (FPASA) as the basis for at least part of the order's 
authority.256 FP ASA gives the President and his subordinates broad authority to pur-
chase goods and services for the federal government and to "prescribe policies and 
directi ves that the President considers necessary to carry out,,257 the function of pro-
moting "'an economical and efficient system' for procurement.,,258 Echoing this lan-
guage, Executive Order 13,279 itself states that it is meant "to ensure the economical 
and efficient administration and completion of Government contracts .... "259 How-
ever, the CCEOs extend beyond the President's procurement powers and conflict 
with congressional intent. Thus, they cannot be sustained under FP ASA. 
1. The History of Presidential Procurement Powers 
The President appears to rely on FP ASA only to defend a portion of Executive 
Order 13,279 that amends anti-discrirnination employment policies found in Executive 
Order 11,246, which dates from the Johnson Administration.260 Among other things, 
Executive Order 11,246 prohibits employment discrimination-including discrimi-
nation on the basis of religion-in federal procurement and construction contracts and 
imposes certain affirmative action obligations upon such contractors.261 Executive 
Order 13,279 provides that religious organizations that contract with the federal gov-
ernment pursuant to FP ASA are not bound by the anti -discrimination provisions in 
Executive Order 11,246 with regard to religion.262 In other words, charitable choice 
grantees can hire co-religionists without running afoul of the Johnson order. Executive 
Order 13,279 explains that it is making the change to further the government's in-
terest in "ensuring that the cost and progress of Federal procurement contracts are 
not adversely affected by an artificial restriction of the labor pool" resulting from 
the exclusion of faith-based organizations from social service contracting.263 
The impact of this change seems somewhat limited, given that Executi ve Order 
11,246 applies only to procurement contracts involving goods and services provided 
to the government and construction contracts.264 Likewise, FPASA, the assumed 
No. 13,198,3 c.F.R. 750-52 (2002), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2006). 
255 Exec. Order No. 13,279,3 C.F.R. 258-62 (2003), reprinted in 5 U.S.c. § 601 (2006). 
256 See id.; see also 40 U.S.C. § 121(a) (2006). 
257 40 U.S.c. § 121(a). 
258 MAYER, supra note 18, at 46. 
259 3 C.F.R. 258. 
260 Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339-48 (1964-1965), reprinted in 42 U.S.c. § 
2000e (2006). 
261 !d. 
262 3 C.F.R. 259-60. 
263 !d. at 261. 
264 See ANGIE A. WELBORN, CHARrrABLECHOICE: LEGALAND CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 8-10 
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source of authority for Executive Order 11,246, does not cover social service contracts 
where the services are provided by non-governmental entities to third parties. 265 Yet 
despite the limited scope ofFPASA and Bush's narrow reliance on that statute, his-
tory suggests that he might rely on the long history of presidential involvement in 
federal procurement to justify the broad sweep of the CCEOs.266 
As reflected by the Johnson executive order, the Presidents since the New Deal 
have issued a stream of executive orders regulating the nation's procurement policies, 
especially with regard to the employment and labor practices of government con-
tractors.z67 During World War II, Roosevelt issued a series of increasingly detailed 
orders that required defense contracts, and later all government contracts, to contain 
clauses prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race or national origin.268 Although 
the orders' practical impact was muted, their symbolic effect was large.269 Roosevelt 
based the orders on his constitutional powers to act in the national defense; the orders 
attempted to assure maximum utilization of available manpower.270 After the war, 
Truman issued an executive order continuing Roosevelt's policies into the peacetime 
economy, and he later used an executive order to create a government committee 
to monitor compliance with the executive order's nondiscrimination principles.27I 
Eisenhower further strengthened the existing executive orders by requiring compli-
ance reports to the President, posting of equal employment opportunity policies in 
workplaces, and anti-discrimination education efforts.272 
(2006), available at http://digital.library. unt.edul govdocs/crslldata/2006/upl-meta-crs-8340/ 
RL32195_2006Jan27.pdf. There are construction contracts related to federal programs that 
are within the scope of FP ASA and thus affected by Executive Order 13,279.ld. at 10. For 
instance, the CCEOs permit government funding for construction or renovation of structures 
owned by religious organizations. See STATE OF THE LAW 2003, supra note 117, at 32. More-
over, the CCEOs cover many programs administered by HUD, "from those that deal with 
affordable housing and community development to grants for homeless shelters and housing 
for people with AIDS." ld. 
265 ''The origins of the congressional authority for Executive Order 11,246 are somewhat 
obscure and have been roundly debated by commentators and courts." Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 
441 U.S. 281, 304 (1979). Nevertheless, most courts have determined that FP ASA provides the 
authority for Executive Order 11,246. See Daniel M. Katz et al., A Commentary on Professor 
Morris's Comparison of Discrimination for Union Activity Under the NLRA and RIA, 3 EMP. 
RTs. & EMP. POL'y J. 305 (1999). 
266 See Michael H. LeRoy, Presidential Regulation of Private Employment: Constitutionality 
oJExecutive Order 12,954 Debarment oJContractors Who Hire Permanent Striker Replace-
ments, 37 B.C. L. REv. 229, 234 (1996) (noting that there were 113 such executive orders prior 
to 1996). 
267 ld. 
268 See MAYER, supra note 18, at 187-88; Debra A. Millenson, W(h)ither Affirmative 
Action: The Future oj Executive Order 11,246,29 U. MEM. L. REv. 679, 685 (1999); LeRoy, 
supra note 266, at 252-54;. 
269 See MAYER, supra note 18, at 189-90. 
270 See Millenson, supra note 268, at 686. 
271 See MAYER, supra note 18, at 190; LeRoy, supra note 266, at 254-55. 
272 See LeRoy, supra note 266, at 257. 
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In 1961, President Kennedy upped the ante by issuing two executive orders re-
quiring federal contractors to take afftrmative action to promote full employment 
opportunities.273 Unlike the prior national defense justiftcations for such executive 
orders, Kennedy based his orders on the principle that "'discrimination because of 
race, creed, color, or national origin is contrary to the Constitutional principles and 
policies of the United States.' ,,274 He also cited prior executive orders as precedential 
authority, "suggesting that these had become something like a cumulating body of 
common law for federal procurement.,,275 Notably, fromFDR through Kennedy, the 
executive branch was far more progressive than Congress in pursuing nondiscrimi-
nation in employment.276 The orders ultimately served as models for later legislation 
and lead to greater public acceptance of nondiscrimination ideals.277 This was accom-
plished in the face of intense congressional resistance to civil rights norms.278 As 
one commentator explained, "[n]o branch of the federal government in the 1950s was 
more hostile to the principle of integrating African Americans than Congress.,,279 
President Johnson issued Executive Order 11,246 shortly after passage of Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.280 He derived the authority for this order from 
FP ASA' s requirement that government procurement be conducted in an economical 
and efftcient matter-an objective achieved by broadening the available labor pool 
in government contracts.281 
A group of government contractors challenged the implementation of Execu-
tive Order 11,246, contending that it constituted a violation of Youngstown's pro-
scription on lawmaking. However, the Third Circuit upheld the executive order in 
Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor,282 ftnding it well within the President's 
authority under FP ASA to ensure that contractors "are not over the long run increas-
ing its costs and delaying its programs by excluding from the labor pool available 
minority workmen.,,283 The Third Circuit noted that Congress had not prohibited 
273 See MAYER, supra note 17, at 197-200; LeRoy, supra note 266, at 258-59. The term 
"affirmative action" was added "almost as an afterthought," and its forthcoming implications 
were not foreseen. See MAYER, supra note 18, at 203. 
274 See LeRoy, supra note 266, at 258 (quoting Exec. Order No. 10,925,26 Fed. Reg. 
1977 (1961». 
275 [d. at 260. 
276 See MAYER, supra note 18, at 184. 
277 See id. at 184-85 ("[P]residential initiative played a decisi ve role in broadening the scope 
of civil rights policies, in a sequence of increasingly effective presidential responses, which 
ultimately pulled along both the courts and Congress."); LeRoy, supra note 266, at 266--67. 
278 LeRoy, supra note 266, at 287. 
279 /d. 
280 Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339-48 (1964-1965), reprinted in 42 U.S.c. § 
2000e (2006). 
281 See MAYER, supra note 18, at 203; Millenson, supra note 268, at 688. The order put 
enforcement authority in the Secretary of Labor and strengthened enforcement mechanisms. 
MAYER, supra note 18, at 203. 
282 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971). 
283 [d. at 170; see also United States v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 553 F.2d 459 (5th 
2007] PRESIDENT BUSH AND THE EXPANSION OF CHARITABLE CHOICE 1137 
the presidential action, but rather, it had continued to make appropriations under 
the contested programs.284 In other words, for the Third Circuit, Executive Order 
11,246 falls within Justice Jackson's flrst category for presidential action authorized 
by Congress. 
Over the same time frame, the Presidents since Franklin Delano Roosevelt 
have also issued a series of executive orders that affect the labor policies of private 
employers.285 These labor relations executive orders were uniformly upheld until 
President Clinton issued Executive Order 12,954, which barred the government from 
contracting with employers who hire permanent striker replacements.286 Clinton 
issued the order to woo disaffected labor groups in the aftermath of his support for 
NAFT A after he failed to persuade Congress to enact a bill that would effectuate 
the same result. 287 Congress debated the bill at length, and a majority in each house 
voted to support it, but a Senate minority threatened a fllibuster, and the bill was not 
passed.288 As authority for the executive order, Clinton cited the federal govern-
ment's interest under FP ASA in "economy, efflciency, and cost of operations" that 
would be furthered by promoting stable relationships between contractors and their 
employees.289 The order stated that use of striker replacements exacerbated labor 
disputes and deprived employers of the accumulated knowledge and skills of the re-
placed employees to the detriment of the federal government. 290 
Several pro-business interests, led by the Chamber of Commerce, challenged the 
order in federal court.291 They asserted that Clinton was violating the NLRA, and, 
in the only rebuke to an executive order since Youngstown, the Court of Appeals for 
the D.C. Circuit agreed.292 In Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, the court held that 
the order was preempted by the National Labor Relations Act and constituted an im-
permissible use of the President's executive powers.293 The court stated that FP ASA 
is not "a blank check for the President to flll in at his Will.,,294 Further, even if the 
order was based on FP ASA, it conflicted with the NLRA-a more speciflc statute.295 
In an exposition oflabor law unnecessary for the present analysis, the court concluded 
Cir. 1977). 
284 Contractors Ass 'n, 442 F.2d at 171. 
285 See LeRoy, supra note 266, at 235-52. 
286 Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ("We conclude that ... 
the Order conflicts with the National Labor Relations Act."); see Exec. Order No. 12,954, 3 
C.F.R. 329-31 (1995), reprinted in 40 U.S.c. § 121 (2006). 
287 See LeRoy, supra note 266, at 230, 280. 
288 See id. at 278-80. 
289 3 C.F.R. 329. 
290 [d. 
291 Reich, 74 F.3d 1322. 
292 [d. 
293 /d. at 1339. 
294 [d. at 1330 (citing AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 618 F.2d 784, 793 (D.C. Cir. 1979». 
295 See id. at 1333. 
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that NLRA, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, allows employers to permanently 
replace economic strikers.296 The court noted that a statutory conflict did not exist 
in Contractors Ass'n orinAFL-CIO v. Kahn, a prior D.C. Circuit opinion upholding 
an executive order issued by President Carter that imposed wage and price controls 
on government contractors.z97 The D.C. Circuit later remarked in rejecting the govern-
ment's petition for rehearing that President Clinton's broad reading of the Procurement 
Act would mean that the President could issue any order as if no other statutes in the 
United States Code existed. 298 Thus, the court essentially concluded that conflict with 
a narrower statute pushed the Clinton executive order into Jackson's third category-
actions contrary to Congressional will. 
Subsequently, in Building & Construction Trades Dep't v. Allbaugh, the D.C. 
Circuit rejected a challenge to an executive order issued by President Bush designed 
to limit union influence over government contracting.299 Executive Order 13,202 pro-
vided that the federal government could neither require nor prohibit contractors from 
entering into project labor agreements (which would require that all contractors on a 
site agree in advance to abide by a master collective bargaining agreement for all work 
on a project). 300 The District Court for the District of Columbia looked to Reich and 
concluded that the President lacked constitutional or statutory authority to impose 
conditions on projects owned by parties other than the federal government and that the 
order conflicted with the NLRA because it altered the delicate balance of bargaining 
and economic power created by that law.30l 
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed; the court distin-
guished Youngstown on the basis that unlike Truman's order, Bush's executive order 
was not self-executing.302 Whereas Bush was directing a subordinate official to en-
force the President's policies only to the extent permitted by other statutes, Truman's 
order overrode other statutes: "Indeed, had President Truman merely instructed the 
296 [d. at 1332-36. The court's finding of a conflict is controversial because it reads Supreme 
Court dicta into the text of the National Labor Relations Act. See Charles Thomas Kimmett, 
Note, Permanent Replacements, Presidential Power, and Politics: Judicial Overreaching in 
Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, 106 YALELJ. 811, 813-26 (1996). 
297 Contractors Ass'n v. Sec'y of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 
(1971); Kahn, 618 F.2d at 792. 
298 Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, 83 F.3d 438, 440 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
299 295 F.3d 28 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
300 Exec. Order No. 13,202,3 C.F.R. 759-61 (2002), reprinted in 41 U.S.C. § 251 (2006). 
301 Bldg. & Constr. Trades Dep't v. Allbaugh, 172 F. Supp. 2d 138, 167 (D.D.C. Cir. 2001), 
rev'd, 295 F.3d 28 (2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1171 (2003). 
302 Allbaugh, 295 F.3d at 33. The decision was authored by Chief Judge Ginsburg, who 
had written an article during the Reagan Administration supporting President Reagan's 
regulatory review executive orders, which were controversial when issued because of the 
President's assertion of authority over rulemaking (discussed infra at Part IV.A). See 
Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House Review of Agency 
Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L. REv. 1075 (1986). 
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Secretary of Commerce to secure the Government's access to steel '[t]o the extent 
pennitted by law,' Youngstown would have been a rather mundane dispute over 
whether the Secretary had statutory authority to act as he did.,,303 The D.C. Circuit 
held further that Bush's executive order did not conflict with the NLRA because it 
constituted proprietary action; that is, it involved the government acting just as a pri-
vate contractor would act. 304 This is significant as a principle of labor law because 
the NLRA only preempts the government when it is acting as a regulator. The court 
distinguished the Clinton executive order at issue in Reich as involving government 
action in a regulatory capacity. 305 Putting the intricacies of labor law aside, the bottom 
line is that in Reich the court perceived a conflict with the NLRA, while in Allbaugh 
the court perceived no conflict. 
Thus, under current law (at least in the D.C. Circuit), the President has authority 
under FPASA to implement substantive procurement policies covered by that statute 
as long as there is no direct conflict with another statute. Even assuming that FP ASA 
covers the subject matter of the CCEOs, the orders are vulnerable because they con-
tain provisions that may conflict with other legal requirements. For instance, feder-
alism concerns are likely to rise to the fore because some state constitutions are more 
protective of anti-establishment values than the federal constitution, and thus state 
laws may conflict with the CCEOS?06 While Congress nas the power to preempt in-
consistent state laws,307 it is far less clear that the President can do this on his own.308 
Still other aspects of the CCEOs, particularly the failure to require secular alternatives 
to sectarian providers, appear to conflict with Supreme Court admonitions against the 
government indoctrination of religion. 
Further, the D.C. Circuit's emphasis on statutory conflict as a limitation on the 
President's powers shows a concern with executive undermining of congressional 
intent. In other words, Congress does not delegate discretion to the executive to carry 
out policies that conflict with other statutes. The CCEOs conflict with congressional 
intent is expressed in the non-enactrnent of the charitable choice bills. Given that the 
303 Allbaugh, 295 F.3d at 33. 
304 [d. at 34-36. 
305 [d. at 34-36, 36 n. *. 
306 See IRA C. Lupu & ROBERTW. TUTTLE, ROUNDTABLE ON REUGION & Soc. WELFARE 
POuey, THE STATE OF THE LAW 2005: LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING PARTNERSHIPS 
BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND FAITH-BASED ORGANIZATIONS 93-95 (2005), available at 
hup://www.religionandsocialpolicy.org/docs/legaUreports/State_oCthe_Law_2005.pdf 
[hereinafter STATE OF THE LAW 2005), 
307 See McClellan, supra note 159, at 1455-78 (discussing preemption doctrine to assess 
whether state and local nondiscrimination provisions survive federal charitable choice laws). 
Even so, it is not clear that Congress chose to preempt state and local laws in the charitable 
choice legislation in the PRA. It stated: "Nothing in this section shall be construed to preempt 
any provision of a State constitution or State statute that prohibits or restricts the expenditure 
of State funds in or by religious organizations." 42 U.S.c. § 604a(k) (Supp. III 1997). 
308 See STATE OF THE LAW 2005, supra note 306, at 99-101. 
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CCEOs conflict with congressional intent, this looks like a paradigmatic case where 
the executive is defying Congress, and the D.C. Circuit's cases suggest that the 
President's procurement powers are thus circumscribed. 
However, the CCEOs facially claim to apply only to the "extent permitted by 
law."309 As a result, the CCEOs might avoid the problem of conflict that doomed 
the Clinton executive order concerning mandatory strikers. Yet, the magical incan-
tation of "to the extent permitted by law" should not save presidential policymak-
ing.310 To be sure, the limited case law on this issue suggests that the President is 
only constrained by existing law; if Congress has not addressed an issue, the President 
can step into the breach and fill it. Yet this opens up vast realms of policymaking 
to the President's control and undermines Youngstown's bedrock principle that 
presidential action must rest on either statutory or constitutional authority. This 
limitation also uses "law" as the only valid expression of congressional intent, while 
the Supreme Court has held that congressional intent can be found in other sources, 
such as inaction, rejected proposals, and other statutes. At bottom, Youngstown 
requires fidelity to congressional intent-however expressed. 
2. Economy and Efficiency 
In addition, the CCEOs might run afoul of the delegation to the executive branch 
in FP ASA, 311 which, while broad, is not a "blank check. ,,312 It is worth a reminder that 
the scope of FP ASA does not extend to social service contracts.313 Nevertheless, lan-
guage of the CCEOs reveals that the President is clearly trying to squeeze the CCEOs 
into this category of broad presidential procurement powers.314 As the cases have 
held, executive orders issued under the Procurement Act must foster an economic 
and efficient system for procurement, a generally lenient standard measured under a 
"reasonable nexus" test. FP ASA was enacted after Wodd War II to improve procure-
ment processes given the "absence of central management" at the time.315 Although 
Presidents have latched on to FP ASA to justify social policies tenuously related to 
these narrow procurement objectives, the CCEOs would stretch this expansion to new 
heights. The President wisely frames his charitable choice initiative in terms of econ-
omy and efficiency,316 knowing the deferential review courts award suchjustifica-
tions. Yet the deference afforded in other contexts may be misplaced here, given that 
the impact of the CCEOs extends far beyond the contracting parties, and thus, far 
309 See Allbaugh, 295 F.3d at 33. 
310 See id. 
311 See supra text accompanying notes 254-59. 
312 ChamberofCommercev. Reich, 74F.3d 1332, 1330-31 (D.C. Cir. 1996)(citingAFL-
CIO v. Kahn, 618 F.2d 784, 793 (D.C. Cir. 1979)). 
313 See supra note 265 and accompanying text. 
314 See supra text accompanying note 266. 
315 Reich, 74 F.3d at 1333. 
316 See supra text accompanying note 259. 
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beyond the objectives of the Procurement Act. Other procurement executive orders 
effectuated new social policies whereby the government was buying services for 
itself.317 With the CCEOs, the government is buying services for delivery to third 
parties.318 By extending contracting opportunities to faith-based organizations, the 
President is using the vulnerabilities of our neediest citizens as a platform for engi-
neering social change unrelated to procurement objectives. 
If the nexus test had any teeth, the President would be hard-pressed to justify 
his empirical claims. The President claims that the CCEOs eliminate discrimination 
against religious groups, which are more effective at solving social problems.319 How-
ever, the preceding federal procurement system for social services did not discriminate 
against faith-based providers.32o From the founding of this country, governments and 
religious groups have had an intertwined and sometimes collaborative relationship 
in providing social welfare.321 In the twentieth century, the government has exten-
sively funded religiously affiliated nonprofit groups as long as those groups were not 
"pervasively sectarian.,,322 For instance, in 1993, government funding accounted for 
ninety-two percent of the revenues for Lutheran Social Ministries, sixty-five percent 
of the revenues for Catholic Charities, and seventy-five percent of the revenues for 
the Jewish Board of Family and Children's Services.323 These interrelationships 
spurred Stephen Monsma to remark, prior to the enactment of the first charitable 
choice statute, "when it comes to public money and religious nonprofit organiza-
tions, sacred and secular miX.,,324 
As far back as 1899, the Supreme Court upheld a congressional appropriation 
for construction of a Catholic hospital, reasoning that the hospital provided secular 
services.325 In 1988, the Supreme Court upheld a federal grant program that funded 
religious organizations to counsel pregnant teenagers while prohibiting abortion-
related services or information.326 As these cases demonstrate, there has never been 
317 See supra text accompanying note 6. 
318 See supra text accompanying notes 7, 127-35. 
319 See supra text accompanying notes 97, 99-01. 
320 See generally Steven K. Green, "A Legacy o/Discrimination" ? The Rhetoric and Reality 
o/the Faith-Based Initiative: Oregon as a Case Study, 84 OR. L. REv. 725 (2005). Professor 
Green examines many studies of religious involvement in social services and concludes that 
"government anti-religious bias does not appear to be a problem." Id. at 754. 
321 Id. at 754 ("FBOs have long participated in government-funded and unfunded social 
service grants and programs."); MONSMA, supra note 53, at 5-6, 9-10. 
322 See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
323 MONSMA, supra note 53, at 1. 
324 /d.; see also FREDRICA D. KRAMER ET AL., UNION INST., FEDERAL POUCY ON THE 
GROUND: FAITH-BASED ORGANIZATIONS DEUVERING SOCIAL SERVICES 3 (2005), available 
athttp://www.urban.orglUploadedPDF/311197_DP05-01.pdf(''Manyfaith-basedsocialservice 
organizations contracted with government long before Charitable Choice and continue to do 
so."); id. at 40. 
325 Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291,297-300 (1899). 
326 Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988). 
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an outright ban on the participation of religiously-affiliated organizations in federal 
grant programs. A major post-1996 study of faith-based contracting at the state and 
local level found that local governmental officials "welcomed the participation of 
faith-based organizations. ,,327 The study "found little indication that public officials 
were hostile to [faith based organizations]" and there were "few allegations from the 
[faith based organizations] about past or present ill treatment.,,328 
Thus, the White House's Unlevel Playing Field is misleading.329 It uses the 
term "faith-based" broadly, without distinguishing between churches and affiliates 
of religious organizations, who have long been eligible to apply for federal grants?30 
To some detractors, the CCEOs are creating an unlevel playing field tilted in a dif-
ferent direction by exempting religious organizations from accountability mecha-
nisms and hiring discrimination laws that apply to secular providers. 331 In addition, 
the CCEOs as applied (but not on their face) may result in some preferences for 
religious organizations in the procurement process, as agencies look for ways to ex-
pand their faith-based contracting.332 
Moreover, to the degree President Bush is trying to integrate congregations into 
the social service network,333 there is scant evidence that these groups either want to 
or realistically can playa meaningful role in human services delivery, which is com-
plex and highly specialized. Studies of congregational involvement in social services 
reveal that many congregations have programs to meet immediate, individual needs, 
such as food banks and clothing drives, but they do not engage in sustained human 
services efforts.334 Most charitable efforts are spearheaded by a tiny group of 
327 See KRAMER ET AL., supra note 324, at 4. 
328 [d. 
329 See supra text accompanying notes 75-77. 
330 See White House Releases Report on Faith-Based and Community Organizations, OMB 
WATCH, Aug. 20, 2001, http://www.ombwatch.org/article/articleview/363. 
331 See supra text accompanying notes 260-62. 
332 Mark Chaves, Debunking Charitable Choice: The Evidence Doesn't Support the 
Political Left or Right, STAN. Soc. INNOVATION REv., Summer 2003, at 33, available at http:// 
www.ssireview.org/pdfl2003SUjeature_chaves.pdf. Chaves discusses a request for proposals 
(RFP) issued by HUD that announced $6.5 million for private entities that eliminate the lead 
poisoning threat to children. The RFP asked applicants to describe how they would involve 
faith-based organizations in their proposed organizations. [d. Similarly, another notice offer-
ing $80 million in grants to control lead poisoning said that faith-based partnerships would 
get higher points in the bidding process than other entities. [d. 
333 See supra notes 6-7. 
334 See Mark Chaves, Testing the Assumptions: Who Provides Social Services?, in SACRED 
PLAcES,CIvILPuRPoSES: SHOULD GOVERNMENT HELP FAlTH-BASED CLERGY? 287, 289 (EJ. 
Dionne Jr. & Ming Hsu Chen eds., 200 1). Only six percent of all congregations report that they 
have a staff person who devotes at least twenty-five percent of his time to social services.!d. 
at 288. Moreover, the median congregation spends only three percent of its total budget, or 
$1,200, on social service programs. !d. 
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volunteers within a congregation. 335 Thus, congregations are best suited to organizing 
small groups to perform discrete tasks.336 
In addition, there is no empirical evidence that a faith-based approach to human 
services is superior to a secular approach.337 Comparing the performance of secular 
and sectarian providers is a challenge in the highly decentralized human services envi-
ronment.338 Moreover, it is also difficult to quantify and measure performance-based 
outcomes for these services, which are intensely interpersonal. 339 In the absence of 
empirical evidence, the administration has touted anecdotal evidence about a few 
allegedly successful faith-based programs and ignored horror stories from other pro-
grams.340 Yet while "[ c ]laims about the success of particular faith-based programs 
are widespread ... there is typically no control group for comparison.,,341 A major 
study by the non-partisan Center for Urban Policy and the Environment compared the 
performance of faith-based and secular entities deliveringjob training and placement 
services to welfare recipients in Indiana pursuant to the Temporary Assistance to 
Needy Families (T ANF) statute.342 The preliminary findings of the researchers were 
that faith-based job training and placement services were "somewhat less effective 
than those of secular organizations.,,343 While both faith-based and secular providers 
were able to put welfare recipients in jobs at the same placement rates at similar 
hourly wages, the "[ c ]lients of the faith-based providers work[ ed] substantially fewer 
hours per week and [were] less likely to be offered health insurance.,,344 The study, 
335 See id. 
336 See id. at 289; see also id. at 290 ("Those results contradict the widely held assumption 
that religious organizations provide social services in a distinctively holistic or personal way."). 
337 See FORMICOLA ET AL., supra note 2, at 172; KRAMER ET AL., supra note 324, at 14 
("There is no systematic evidence that the quality of services delivered by faith-based organi-
zations is superior to the quality of services provided by other social service providers."). 
338 See infra note 341 and accompanying text. 
339 See Partha Deb & Dana Jones, Does Faith Work? A Preliminary Comparison of Labor 
Market Outcomes of Job Training Programs, n CEN1ERFOR URBANPOUCY ANDlHEENVIRON-
MENT,CHARITABlECHOICE:FIRsTREsULTSFROMTHREESTATES57,57 (Sheila Suess Kennedy 
& Wolfgang Bielefeld eds., 2003), available at http://ccr.urbancenter.iupui.eduJPDFs/lnterim 
%20report/lnterim%20report%20PDF.pdf [hereinafter CHARITABlE CHOICE: FIRST REsULTS] 
(noting difficulties of drawing comparisons due to problems in measuring outcomes "where 
quality is not easily quantified and multiple objectives and constituencies frequently exist"). 
340 See Gilman, supra note 8, at 802-03; see also Mark A.R. Kleiman, Faith Based Fudging: 
How a Bush-Promoted Christian Prison Program Fakes Success by Massaging Data, SLATE, 
Aug. 5, 2003, http://www.slate.com/idl2086617 (explaining how a study of a Bible-centered 
prison program misrepresented outcomes by engaging in selection bias). 
341 See KRAMER ET AL., supra note 324, at 15 (noting that there is selection bias in faith-
based interventions: "[T]hose who choose to participate in faith-based programs and those 
who stay in such programs may have an explicit affinity to the religious or spiritual grounding 
of the intervention."). 
342 See generally CHARITABlE CHOICE: FIRST RESULTS, supra note 339. 
343 [d. at iv. 
344 [d. 
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however, does not shed light on other forms of social service provision.345 While most 
researchers agree that faith-based organizations bring unique attributes to the human 
services field due to their strong community ties,346 there is no evidence that these 
attributes can be harnessed to create better outcomes or that these benefits cannot 
be realized when churches set up religiously-affiliated non-profits. 
In sum, there is neither a history of discrimination against faith-based organiza-
tions in social service contracting nor a compelling justification for altering the prior 
balance between secular and sectarian. Instead, charitable choice could lead to in-
efficiencies of its own. Governments at all levels will have to undertake extensive 
monitoring to ensure that faith-based contractors comply with constitutional limits, 
raising the risk of government entanglement with religion. Current research shows 
that congregations lack the knowledge and competence to understand the complex 
constitutional restrictions on the use of government funds. 347 For instance, a survey 
of congregational leaders revealed that sixty-seven percent did not know that they 
were prohibited from using their government funds for religious activities such as 
prayer or Bible study.348 Moreover, many small congregations are unprepared to deal 
with the requirements of government contracting:349 They have neither adequate staff 
nor the capacity for the data management and reporting that are required to meet gov-
ernment accountability mechanisms.35o Not surprisingly, charitable choice is already 
generating what will likely be a long road of litigation as the practices of specific 
faith-based providers are challenged for constitutional violations.351 While Congress 
does not need ajustification for implementing charitable choice, the President does 
as long as he is relying on his procurement powers. 
D. Evasion of Hard Look Review 
Of course, because Bush's order is essentially self-executing, these efficiency and 
economy concerns were never meaningfully aired or considered by the agencies. By 
contrast, if an executive agency had decided to implement charitable choice on its 
own, without express statutory authorization, the agency's change in policies would 
345 A separate study of Los Angeles W elfare-to-Work programs found that no type of pro-
vider-governmental, non-profit, or religious-was superior or inferior to others. See KRAMER 
ET AL., supra note 324, at 14. Each type of program had certain advantages. See id. at 14-15. 
For-profit providers had the highest placement rates; government programs had employees 
who were particularly helpful; and faith-based organizations and other non-profits were per-
ceived as most empathetic by clients. [d. 
346 See id. at 41-42. 
347 See CHARITABLE CHOICE: FIRST REsULTS, supra note 339, at iv. 
348 See id. at v. 
349 See KRAMER ET AL., supra note 324, at 42. 
350 See id. at 42-43. 
351 See STATE OF THE LAW 2005, supra note 306, at 35-88. 
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be subject to hard look review by the courts. Prior to welfare reform and the CCEOs, 
many agencies had written policies limiting faith-based contracting that had to be 
revoked in order to implement President Bush's executive order. For example, the 
Department of Education (DOE) previously barred religious schools and divinity 
departments from applying for certain federal grants.352 The new rule eliminates that 
barrier and permits seminaries and divinity schools to participate in DOE programs 
as long as they comply with the restrictions on religious use of government grant 
funds. 353 Likewise, pre-existing rules prohibited the use of federal funds for reno-
vating or constructing churches?54 Now, rules that affect programs administered by 
USDA, HUD, Department of Labor (DOL), and USAID all permit faith-based organi-
zations to use federal funds to acquire, construct, or rehabilitate structures, as long as 
the buildings are used for eligible activities.355 In addition, many agencies previously 
required faith-based organization grantees to provide assurances in their contracts 
that they would not use direct government funding for religious purposes.356 Those 
assurances are no longer required. 357 
Thus, the CCEOs have wrought a major shift in agency practices. It is a settled 
principle of administrative law that agencies must justify a change in policy posi-
tions. This requirement was set forth in the Supreme Court's 1983 decision in Motor 
Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n v. State Farm Automobile Insurance Co.358 In State 
Farm, the Court reversed a decision by the National Highway Traffic Safety Admin-
istration (NHTSA) to revoke a rule that required manufacturers to equip all new cars 
with passi ve restraints,359 a change in position driven by President Reagan's deregu-
lation agenda. Under State Farm, an agency must show that it examined the relevant 
data and made a "rational connection between the facts found and the choice made."360 
Without such a rational connection, the agency's decision is "arbitrary and capri-
ciOUS."361 Agency policy is particularly suspect where, as here, the agency "has relied 
on factors which Congress has not intended [the agency] to consider."362 "[T]he sub-
merged yet powerful message ... in State Farm [is] that the political directions of 
352 Participation in Education Department Programs by Religious Organizations; Providing 
for Equal Treatment of All Education Program Participants, 69 Fed. Reg. 31,708--09 (June 
4,2004) (revising 34 C.F.R. pts. 74, 75, 76,80). 
353 [d. 
354 STATE OF THE LAW 2004, supra note 122, at 75. 
355 [d. at 73. 
356 [d. at 75. 
357 See id. at 76. 
358 463 U.S. 29 (1983). 
359 [d. at 30-3l. 
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a particular administration are inadequate to justify regulatory policy. ,,363 Although 
presidential preferences can and do influence agency outcomes, agencies still need to 
engage in the reasoning process and articulate a rational basis for a particular result. 364 
If an agency had undertaken to write charitable choice into regulatory policy in the 
absence of the executive orders, it would have had to articulate a justification for 
faith-based contracting. Not only would the agency have to confront the efficiency 
and economy arguments outlined above,365 but it would also have to consider the en-
tire litany of policy and constitutional concerns that swirl around charitable choice.366 
This is exactly what Congress did when it considered, but then rejected, expanding 
charitable choice.367 The entire process of agency deliberation was shortcut by 
President Bush's executive orders. Moreover, and perhaps most damaging to such an 
agency initiative, the agency would have to identify statutes that give it the authority 
to engage in faith-based contracting in the first place. As discussed earlier, the human 
services statutes do not provide the needed ambiguity. 368 Thus, on a hard look review, 
the policy might very well fail as arbitrary and capricious. 
ill. CONSTITUTIONAL COMPULSION 
It is possible that the President would seek to legitimate the CCEOs by contending 
that he was compelled to issue them because they are mandated by the Constitution. 
Executive Order 13,279 contains glimmers of such an argument: It states that the 
order is designed "to ensure equal protection of the laws for faith-based and commu-
nity organizations" because "[n]o organization should be discriminated against on 
the basis of religion or religious belief in the administration or distribution of Federal 
financial assistance under social service programs. ,,369 The use of terms such as 
"equal protection" and "discrimination" not coincidentally echoes arguments by some 
legal scholars (including the architects of charitable choice) that mandatory inclusion 
of religious groups in government funding programs that include secular entities is 
a constitutional imperative.370 These scholars argue that the Free Exercise Clause 
363 See JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARPST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY 226 
(1990). 
364 State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43. 
365 See supra Part II.C.2. 
366 See supra Part I.C. 
367 See supra Part I.A. 
368 See supra Part II.B. 
369 Exec. Order No. 13,279,3 C.F.R. 258, 260 (2003), reprinted in 5 U.S.c. § 601 (2006). 
370 See, e.g., Carl H. Esbeck, Myths, Miscues, and Misconceptions: No-Aid Separationism 
and the Establishment Clause, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'y 285, 300 (1999) 
('The exclusion of certain faith-based social service providers from program eligibility simply 
because of what they believe, or because of how they practice and express what they believe, 
is discriminatory on the bases of religious speech and religious exercise."); Eugene Volokh, 
Equal Treatment is Not Establishment, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'y 341,365 
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requires equal treatment of secular and sectarian groups, without any regard to the 
content of their beliefs. To do otherwise, in their view, punishes religion and unfairly 
elevates secular beliefs over spiritual ones. However, these arguments have not 
prevailed in the Supreme Court. 
The Court has not yet addressed the constitutionality of charitable choice pro-
grams. However, existing caselaw in the context of school funding indicates that 
charitable choice programs enacted by Congress are facially constitutional as long as 
they do not result in government indoctrination of religion. Accordingly, the lower 
federal courts have upheld charitable choice programs that adhere to the Court's artic-
ulated constitutional limitations and stricken those that have lead to worship and pros-
elytizing with government money.371 
Nevertheless, while charitable choice may be a permissible policy choice, it is 
not a mandatory one. This distinction was set forth in Locke v. Davey,372 in which 
Joshua Davey, a college student who had been awarded a state academic, needs-based 
scholarship, sued Washington State when it forbade him from using his scholarship 
to pay for a degree in devotional theology as part of his studies to become a min-
ister.373 A state statute excluded devotional theology majors from the scholarship 
program, based on a state constitutional provision that bars the appropriation of public 
money for religious instruction.374 Davey argued that the state's failure to fund his 
religious studies violated his free exercise rights, and the Ninth Circuit agreed with 
him.375 By a vote of 7-2, the Supreme Court reversed and upheld the exclusion.376 
(1999) ("I also believe equal treatment is constitutionally compelled."). 
371 Compare Teen Ranch, Inc. v. Udow, No. 05-2371, 2007 WL 128770 (6th Cir. Jan. 17, 
2007) (holding state welfare officials did not violate the constitutional rights of Teen Ranch, 
a residential, faith-based program for troubled youth, by refusing to use state funds to place 
teenagers in the program); Arns. United for Separation of Church & State v. Prison Fellowship 
Ministries, 432 F. Supp. 2d 862 (S.D. Iowa 2006) (holding Christian prison rehabilitation 
program violated the Equal Protection Clause because it indoctrinated inmates in Evangelical 
Christianity); Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. McCallum, 179 F. Supp. 2d 950 (W.D. 
Wis. 2002) (holding faith-based drug rehabilitation program violated the Equal Protection 
Clause because the program involved faith-intensive counseling and state funds had been used 
to pay at least part ofthe salaries of the counselors), with Am. Jewish Congo V. Corp. for Nat'l 
& Comty. Serv., 399 F.3d 351 (D.c. Cir. 2005) (holding Americorps program that places 
teachers in Catholic schools does not violate the Establishment Clause because it is indirect, 
rather than direct, financing of religion); Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. V. McCallum, 
324 F.3d 880 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding religiously oriented halfway house for parolees did not 
violate Establishment Clause because it involved indirect funding); Freedom from Religion 
Found., Inc. V. Nicholson, No. 06-C-212-S, 2007 WL 80857 (W.D. Wis. Jan. 8,2007) (holding 
chaplaincy programs in Veterans Affairs hospitals do not violate the Establishment Clause). 
372 540 U.S. 712 (2004). 
373 [d. 
374 [d. at 716. 
375 [d. at 718. 
376 [d. at 725. For extended analyses of the case, see Steven K. Green, Locke V. Davey and 
the Limits to Neutrality Theory, 77 TEMP. L. REv. 913 (2004); Douglas Laycock, Theology 
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The Court concluded that the scholarship limitation neither violated Davey's 
free exercise rights under the First Amendment nor discriminated against religion. 377 
There was no doubt, and the parties did not contest, that the State could choose to 
provide scholarships for devotional theology studies.378 In such a situation, the private 
and independent choice of the college student would break: the link between govern-
ment funds and religious training and thereby vitiate any establishment clause con-
cerns.379 However, Washington's decision to exclude theology students from the 
scholarship program reflected the state's substantial and historically-rooted anti-
establishment interest in not using tax dollars to support the ministry. 380 The state's 
choice did not impose sanctions upon Davey's religious beliefs or keep anyone from 
participating in political affairs based on religious status-two forms ofline-drawing 
that the Court previously held are constitutionally suspect.38I Moreover, the burden 
of the exclusion on Davey was minimal because he could use his scholarship money 
to pursue any other line of study. 382 He could even take religion courses at a religious 
college as long as he pursued a secular degree.383 He simply could not pursue a re-
ligious major with his scholarship funds.384 Thus, "there are some state actions per-
mitted by the Establishment Clause but not required by the Free Exercise Clause. ,,385 
The decision thus rejected the strict vision of neutrality pushed by the Bush 
Administration, in which religious and secular beliefs are constitutionally "fungible" 
for funding purposes.386 The Court's rejection of strict neutrality principles repre-
sents "deference to legislative choices.,,387 As Steven Green explains, neutrality may 
"support[] a legislative decision to allow religious uses of a general benefit," but it 
"does not rrulndate the inclusion of religious uses under a different program. ,,388 With 
charitable choice, as with Locke, there is no violation of the free-exercise rights of 
religious groups if they are legislatively excluded from grant programs. They remain 
free to pursue their religious beliefs in any way they see fit; they simply do not get 
Scholarships, the Pledge of Allegiance, and Religious Liberty: Avoiding the Extremes but 
Missing the Liberty, 118 HARV. L. REv. 155 (2004). 
377 Locke, 540 U.S. at 725. 
378 /d. at 719. 
379 See id. 
380 [d. at 721-22. 
381 [d. at 720-21. 
382 See id. 
383 [d. at 724-25. 
384 [d. 
385 [d. at 719. 
386 See Richard C. Schragger, The Role of the Local in the Doctrine and Discourse of 
Religious Liberty, 117 HARV. L. REv. 1810, 1862 (2004). 
387 Green, supra note 376, at 943. 
388 [d.; see also Schragger, supra note 386, at 1865 (noting that Locke affirms that 
legislatures are allowed "to express political judgments about the extent of church-state 
entanglement") . 
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a piece of the government pie to provide secular services, which cannot involve 
religious activities in any event. 
There are legitimate reasons for the Court's deference to the legislative branch 
to make determinations about the role of religion in public life. In our system of 
representation, legislators are expected to exercise independent judgment in making 
difficult decisions while also being responsive to their constituents.389 Thus, any 
legislative decision results from the interweaving of multiple perspectives into a 
negotiated compromise. Especially where religion is involved, as it "stands very 
near the moral core of the nation,,,39o the cumbersome legislative process serves to 
check the impulse toward faction and to foster debate and compromise.391 Indeed, 
the Court has noted that history shows that "the regular political process has safe-
guarded the religious freedom of minorities as well as-and often better than-the 
courtS.,,392 Louis Fisher has explained that when religious organizations work with 
other groups to press for social change, they have had a substantial impact.393 By 
contrast, religious factions have not fared well in the legislative process because 
other groups come forward and block them.394 
From an institutional perspective, legislators can better balance governmental 
and public interests, assess how to spend limited public resources, and determine how 
to tackle complex and multi-variable social problems than the other two branches. 395 
With regard to expanding charitable choice, Congress might consider a slew of factors, 
such as the advisability of endorsing co-religionist discrimination; the effectiveness 
of existing charitable choice programs; past experiences with existing statutes; which 
populations can best be served by charitable choice, if any; how to avoid government 
entanglement in religion; how to ensure that religious social service providers remain 
accountable to contract terms and program requirements; and the like. These factors 
are all particularly well-suited for resolution by the legislative branch. 
389 See Marci A. Hamilton, Religion, the Rule of Law, and the Good of the Whole: A View 
from the Clergy, 18 J.L. & POL. 387,416 (2002). 
390 WILUAM LEE MIl1.ER, THE FIRST LmERTY: AMERICA'S FOUNDATION IN REUGIOUS 
FREEDOM, at xii (2003). 
391 See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) ("[Dlemocratic government 
must be preferred to a system in which each conscience is a law unto itself or in which judges 
weigh the social importance of all laws against the centrality of all religious beliefs."). 
392 LOUIS FISHER, REUGIOUS LmERTY IN AMERICA: POUTICAL SAFEGUARDS 1 (2002). 
393 Id. at 60. 
394 Id. 
395 See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Accommodation and Equal Liberty, 42 WM. & MARY L. 
REv. 1007, 1034 (2001) ("[L legislatures are better able than courts to resolve the complex bal-
ancing of governmental interests and resources often involved in determining the proper scope 
of particular exemptions. "). But see Ira C. Lupu, The Case Against Legislative Codification 
of Religious Liberty, 21 CARDOZO L. REv. 565 (1999) (arguing that courts, and not legislatures, 
should determine whether to make permissive accommodations for religious organizations 
from laws of general applicability). 
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Nevertheless, it could be that President Bush disagrees with the result in Locke 
and wants to impose his own constitutional interpretation of neutrality under the 
Religion Clauses on the agencies. This would be a controversial position with the 
potential to put the President at loggerheads with the courts. To be sure, conven-
tional notions of judicial supremacy have come under attackinrecent years, beginning 
mostpublicly with Attorney General Edwin Meese's statements during the Reagan 
Administration that "constitutional interpretation is not the business of the Court 
only, but also properly the business of all branches of government."396 Departmental-
ism, the academic school of thought that embodies this view, contends as an original-
ist and normative matter that each federal branch of government has the independent 
authority to interpret the constitution unrestrained by any other branch's interpreta-
tion.397 Even judicial supremacists agree that the President has an important role in 
interpreting the Constitution, especially when he decides whether to present legis-
lation to Congress or to veto legislation, in appointing judges to the federal judiciary, 
and when he considers how best to execute statutes.398 Yet judicial supremacists dis-
agree that the President can (or should) undermine settled constitutional interpreta-
tions by the Supreme Court.399 
In the case of the CCEOs, there is no indication that the President is seeking a 
showdown with the Supreme Court over the proper definition of "neutrality" within 
the Religion Clauses.4OO The CCEOs state that they apply only to the "extent per-
mitted by law,"401 thus codifying the President's willingness to defer to the expressed 
choices made by the other branches within their spheres of authority. In addition, 
President Bush continues to push for passage of legislation to codify his initiative;402 
legislation would be unnecessary ifhe believed the orders were constitutionally com-
pelled. In any event, this is not an area of the law where the Court is attempting to 
aggrandize power for itself; a frequent target for departmentalists.403 To the contrary, 
3% Edwin Meese III, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TuL. L. REv. 979,985 (1987). 
397 This position is articulated in its strongest fonn in Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most 
Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217 (1994). His 
position is that the President is a co-equal interpreter of the Constitution who does not need 
to enforce Court judgments even in the cases in which they are rendered. /d. 
398 See Dawn E. Johnsen, Functional Departmentalism and Nonjudicial Interpretation: 
Who Determines Constitutional Meaning?, 67 LAw & CONlEMP. PROBS., Summer 2004, at 105, 
112-13. 
399 See Scott E. Gant, Judicial Supremacy and Nonjudicial Interpretation of the Constitution, 
24 HASTINGS CaNST. L.Q. 359,367-69 (1997). 
400 For his part, Attorney General Meese's words were more bluster than bite. See Johnsen, 
supra note 398, at 107,117-18. 
401 See Bldg. & Constr. Trades Dep't v. Allbaugh, 295 F.3d 28, 33 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
402 A 2006 White House press release states, ''The President Continues to Seek Congres-
sional Action Providing Charitable Choice Protections to Other Social Service Programs." 
Compassion in Action, supra note 123. 
403 See Gant, supra note 399, at 369-73. 
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where religion is concerned, the Court is more often than not deferring to the political 
branches to make difficult choices, thereby "energizing the political process.,,404 
By wresting interpretive authority from the courts, departmentalism is supposed 
to further "cautious and interactive deliberation," promote education about constitu-
tional questions, and "provide a rich source of information exchanged in the dialogic 
process.,,405 It rests on the idea that the "best possible constitutional outcomes would 
result from the constitutional clashes and vibrant disagreement likely to result from 
the absence of deference.,,406 To achieve these goals, it is imperative that law "not be 
reduced simply to politics.,,407 Prior to the CCEOs, there was a rich and developing 
dialogue between Congress, the courts, the President, and the public over the per-
missible boundaries of direct funding to religious organizations driven in part by the 
Court's deference to political choices.408 There is little to be gained and much to be 
lost if the President cuts off this discourse by overriding the balance that has been 
struck by the Court for issues of religious liberty. Even the staunchest promoter of 
executive departmentalism urges that the President use executive restraint and be 
guided by a principle of deference to interpretations of the other branches.409 For all 
these reasons, President Bush is unlikely to argue that the CCEOs are constitution-
ally compelled. Instead, due to the undefined boundaries of the "wne of twilight,"410 
the President's strongest argument is that the CCEOs are constitutionally permitted 
exercises of his powers under the Take Care Clause. 
IV. TAKE CARE CLAUSE 
As Part II reveals, President Bush lacks express or implied statutory authority 
for imposing his faith-based preference on federal human service programs. As Part 
ill reveals, the CCEOs are not constitutionally compelled. The question then arises 
whether the CCEOs fall within Youngstown's "zone of twilight," where the President 
has concurrent authority with Congress and must "rely upon his own independent 
powers."411 Does the President have independent powers to direct agency action? 
Article II of the Constitution vests executive power in the President, but it says little 
about the scope and extent of that power in the domestic sphere.412 The President has 
404 See Scbragger, supra note 386, at 1854. 
405 Gant, supra note 399, at 388, 393, 397. 
406 Johnsen, supra note 398, at 121. 
407 See id. at 130. 
408 See id. at 114-15. 
409 See Paulsen, supra note 397, at 331-42. 
410 See supra Part II.A. 
411 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,637 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring). 
412 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 ('The executive power shall be vested in a President of the United 
States of America."). 
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the authority to appoint "officers" of the United States, and he can "require the opin-
ion, in writing" of those officers.413 Beyond those specifications, Article II directs 
the President to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed.,,414 Not only is this 
language vague, but the history surrounding the Take Care Clause is not determina-
tive, probably because the Framers themselves disagreed over the proper scope of 
executive power.415 As a result, vast disagreements over the scope of presidential 
powers remain unresolved. This uncertainty creates an opening for Presidents to jus-
tify their domestic policy-making under the Take Care Clause.416 Indeed, suchjusti-
fications underlie a series of regulatory review executive orders that were initially 
seen by some as radically interfering with agency discretion but which eventually 
have become a mundane part of the structure of the administrative state. However, 
as this Part explains, the CCEOs go far beyond the scope and effect of the regulatory 
review orders, and thus, cannot stand on the same footing. 
A. The Regulatory Review Executive Orders 
Since the 1970s, Presidents have sought to impose centralized review over the 
ever-increasing work product of administrative agencies.417 The 1970s saw the bur-
geoning of new agencies with the authority to regulate vast swaths of economic activ-
ity such as the Consumer Product Safety Commission, the Environmental Protection 
Agency, and the Occupational Safety and Health Agency.418 Amidst concerns that 
the regulatory process was creating far greater burdens on business than benefits for 
the country, the Presidents sought to impose centralization and coordination over regu-
lation that was widely viewed as running amuck. 419 Presidents realized "that their grip 
on the course of domestic policy hinged to a considerable extent on their ability to 
influence the thousands of rules that put programs into action. ,,420 President Nixon 
413 Id. § 2. 
414 /d. § 3. 
415 See Yvette M. Barksdale, The Presidency and Administrative Value Selection, 42 AM. 
U. L. REv. 273, 289-90 (1993) ("Indeed, the vagueness of ... Article [II] itself may have 
resulted from the Framers' failure to agree on a view of executive power."); Martin S. Flaherty, 
The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 Y ALEL.I. 1725, 1755 (1996)(describing the narrative of 
the founding as revealing "at the most general level people groping ... toward a workable 
conception of government from which only broad purposes can safely be inferred"). 
416 See Peter M. Shane, Presidential Regulatory Oversight and the Separation of Powers: 
The Constitutionality of Executive Order No. 12,291,23 ARIz. L. REv. 1235, 1246 (''The 
executive branch typically relies on [the Take Care Clause] to justify independent Presidential 
initiatives in domestic affairs .... "). 
417 For a detailed history of the regulatory review executive orders, see CORNEUUS M. 
KERWIN, RULEMAKING: How GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WRITE LAW AND MAKE POUCY 
118-23 (3d ed. 2003); MAYER, supra note 18, at 122-37. 
418 See MAYER, supra note 18, at 123. 
419 Id. 
420 KERWIN, supra note 417, at 119. 
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started down the path of regulatory review by creating the Office of Management 
and Budget (OMB) and charging OMB with conducting a "quality of life" review 
of proposed regulations, especially those promulgated by EPA. 421 Presidents Ford 
and Carter each issued executive orders that not only provided for OMB review of 
major regulations, but also required agencies to prepare inflationary impact statements 
(Ford) and cost-benefit analysis (Carter) for proposed regulations.422 
President Reagan was the first President to give regulatory review some teeth 
by giving the White House enforcement authority over the rulemaking process. In 
Executive Order 12,291, Reagan mandated that executive agencies weigh the costs 
and benefits of existing and proposed regulations and take action only if "the potential 
benefits to society for the regulation outweigh the potential costS.,,423 Executive Order 
12,291 also required that agencies attempt to maximize social benefits, choose the 
least costly alternative in selecting among regulatory objectives, and set priorities with 
the goal of maximizing net benefits.424 Under the order, the Office of Information 
and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), a unit within OMB, was charged with reviewing 
the agencies' analysis of major rules and could "recommend the withdrawal of regu-
lations which cannot be reformulated to meet its objections."425 Reagan later issued 
Executive Order 12,498 to extend these review principles to the regulatory planning 
process, before rules were drafted.426 During the Reagan Administration, OMB largely 
used its authority under Executive Order 12,291 to pursue the President's deregu-
lation agenda, and critics charged that the order allowed the White House covertly 
to interfere with and delay rulemakings.427 
President George H. W. Bush continued Reagan's regulatory review orders, but 
he transferred OMB's regulatory review authority to a newly created Council on 
Competiti veness headed by Vice President Quayle.428 The Council became a lighting 
rod for criticism because most of its activities were shrouded in secrecy, including 
ex parte contacts.429 In his first year in office, President Clinton replaced Executive 
Order 12,291 with Executive Order 12,866, which continued Reagan's substantive 
requirement for cost-benefit analysis and review while curbing the more controversial 
421 See MAYER, supra note 18, at 124. 
422 See id. at 124-26. 
423 Exec. Order No. 12,291,3 C.F.R. 127, 128 (1981). 
424 Id. 2(c)-(e), 3 C.F.R. at 128. 
425 MAYER, supra note 18, at 126. 
426 Exec. Order No. 12,498,3 C.F.R. 323 (1985). 
427 See generally Alan B. Morrison, OMB Interference with Agency Rulemaking: The Wrong 
Way to Write a Regulation, 99 HARv. L. REv. 1059 (1986). "The Administration has principally 
used the system of OMB review created by the Executive Orders to implement a myopic vision 
of the regulatory process which places the elimination of cost to industry above all other con-
siderations." Id. at 1065. 
428 See MAYER, supra note 18, at 130-31. 
429 See id. at 131. 
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portions of the Reagan order. 430 He modified the cost -benefit paradigm by requiring 
that agencies consider qualitative costs and benefits in addition to quantifiable ones, 
as well as "distributional impacts" and "equity.,,431 To minimize delay, Executive 
Order 12,866 required that OIRA limit its review to major rules and complete its 
assessment within ninety days.432 To reduce conflict, Executive Order 12,866 pro-
vided that the President or Vice President would resolve disputes between the agen-
cies and OIRA.433 To increase transparency, the order required that OIRA publicly 
maintain a log of ex parte contacts.434 The Clinton order also extended the procedural 
(but not the substantive) review requirements to the independent agencies, which 
Reagan had left out of Executive Order 12,291 due to constitutional questions sur-
rounding presidential assertions of authority over the independent agencies.435 For 
his part, President George W. Bush has left Executive Order 12,866 intact but has 
issued his own executive order requiring that agencies give special attention to energy-
related issues in rulemakings.436 
Congress's response to these executi ve orders has been muted.437 Prior to 1996, 
Congress proposed, but could not enact, various pieces of legislation designed to 
recapture power over regulatory review. In 1996, Congress enacted the Congressio-
nal Review Act to require that agencies transmit major regulations to the General 
Accounting Office, which then reviews the rules for compliance with applicable 
statutes and executive orders and reports its findings to Congress.438 Under the Act, 
Congress can disapprove a proposed regulation by enacting ajoint resolution of dis-
approval.439 However, the Act is widely considered to be ineffective and understaffed, 
and only one joint resolution of disapproval has passed.440 
The regulatory review executive orders have been controversial since their incep-
tion, with critics charging that they are not only bad policy, but also illegal exercises 
430 Exec. Order No. 12,866,3 C.F.R. 638-49 (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2000). 
431 /d. § l(a), 3 c.F.R. at 639. 
432 /d. § 6(b), 3 C.F.R. at 646-47. 
433 /d. § 7, 3 C.F.R. at 648. 
434 Id. § 6(b)(4)(C), 3 C.F.R. at 647-48. 
435 See James F. Blumstein, Regulatory Review by the Executive Office o/the President: 
An Overview and Policy Analysis o/Current Issues, 51 DUKE L.J. 851, 853 (2001). Clinton 
also issued subsequent orders requiring agencies to consider the impact of rules on "poor and 
minority populations, children, and tribal governments." See MAYER, supra note 18, at 132. 
436 Exec. Order No. 13,211,3 C.F.R. 767 (2002), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 13,201 (2006). 
437 This is not surprising given the institutional constraints Congress faces in overturning 
executive orders. See infra text accompanying notes 438-49. 
438 5 U.S.C. §§ 801-08 (2000). 
439 /d. § 802. 
440 See MAYER, supra note 18, at 133; MORTON ROSENBERG, CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW OF 
AGENCY RUIEMAKING: AN ASSESSMENT AFTER NUUlFICATION OF OSHA's ERGONOMICS 
STANDARD 5-6 (2002). 
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of executive lawmaking lacking constitutional or statutory support.441 Acknowledging 
the uncertainty surrounding this new exercise of presidential power, the Office of 
Legal Counsel (OLC) issued a detailed legaljustification for President Reagan's regu-
latory review executive orders that articulated a view of the President as a unitary 
executive.442 Relying heavily on the case of Myers v. United States, in which the 
Supreme Court held that Congress could not limit the President's removal powers 
over purely executive officers,443 OLC concluded the President has the power "to 
'supervise and guide' executive officers in 'their construction of the statutes under 
which they act in order to secure that unitary and uniform execution of the laws which 
Article II of the Constitution evidently contemplated in vesting general executive 
power in the President alone.",444 OLe went on to state that only the President "has 
a national constituency" and therefore, "he is uniquely situated to design and execute 
a uniform method for undertaking regulatory initiatives that responds to the will of 
the public as a whole.,,445 Moreover, the President can reduce the "confusion and in-
consistency" that would result if agencies issued contrary and conflicting regulations.446 
OLC acknowledged that presidential power "must conform to legislation enacted 
by Congress.,,447 However, "[ w ]hen Congress delegates legislative power to executive 
agencies, it is aware that those agencies perform their functions subject to presidential 
supervision on matters of both substance and procedure."448 Given that the President 
has the power to remove the heads of cabinet agencies, OLC reasoned that Congress 
clearly cannot immunize those officials from presidential supervision.449 
The most questionable portion of Executive Order 12,291, as OLC recognized, was 
its substantive requirement that agencies use cost-benefit analysis in their decision-
making processes.450 OLC concluded that this was permissible for two reasons. First, 
OLC contended that cost-benefit assessment was a permissible consideration in 
agency decision-making.451 Moreover, Congress could, if it wanted to, displace cost-
benefit analysis with another form of assessment because the executive order was 
441 See generally Morrison, supra note 427; Morton Rosenberg, Beyond the Limits of 
Executive Power: Presidential Control of Agency Rulemaking Under Executive Order 12,291, 
80 MICH. L. REv. 193 (1981). Articles supporting the constitutionality of the regulatory review 
orders include Frank B. Cross, Executive Orders 12,291 and 12,498: A Test Case in Presi-
dential Control of Executive Agencies, 4 J.L. & POL. 483 (1988); Shane, supra note 416. 
442 5 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 59 (1981). 
443 272 U.S. 52, 135 (1926). 
444 5 Op. Off. Legal Counsel at 60 (quoting Myers, 272 U.S. at 135). 
445 /d. at 60-61. 




450 /d. at 63. 
451 /d. 
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only applied "to the extent permitted by law.,,452 Second, the order left decision-
making discretion to the agencies to conduct the cost-benefit assessment, and OMB 
could not compel a certain result because its role was "advisory and consultative.,,453 
Despite the legal and prudential concerns surrounding the regulatory review exec-
utive orders, they never faced a frontal legal challenge and have "now taken center 
stage as an institutionalized part of the modern American presidency.,,454 Yet, even 
accepting the premises of regulatory review, the CCEOs cannot be similarly justified. 
To begin, while agencies would generally be expected to conduct cost-benefit assess-
ments even in the absence of an executive order, pushing the boundaries of church-
state relationships has not historically been part of agency decision-making. To the 
contrary, until the Bush Administration, agencies avoided giving government funds 
directly to churches in order to comply with Supreme Court precedent that prohibited 
government from funding "pervasively sectarian" groupS.455 The Supreme Court has 
recently shifted towards a less separationist stance that views neutrality as the touch-
stone by which to judge government funding schemes that provide direct aid to re-
ligious groupS.456 Current court precedent indicates that direct aid programs such as 
charitable choice are permissible as long as the aid lacks religious content, is distrib-
uted based on neutral criteria, and is not diverted for religious purposes.457 Neverthe-
less, although the Supreme Court would likely uphold charitable choice statutes, it 
has held that inclusion of religious groups in government funding schemes is not 
constitutionally required.458 Rather, it is within the legislature's discretion to decide 
whether or not to include churches within the funding fold.459 In short, adopting a 
faith-based funding scheme is simply not a historic part of agency decision-making 
processes, and there are good reasons to prefer legislative judgments about the advis-
ability of these programs. 
In addition, while the regulatory review orders seize upon the President's super-
visory capacities,460 the CCEOs are not similarly animated by managerial objecti ves. 
452 /d. 
453 Id. at 63-64. 
454 Blumstein, supra note 435, at 854-55. 
455 See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 9, at 5-6,21-26. 
456 See Ira C. Lupu & Robert Tuttle, The Distinctive Place of Religious Entities in Our 
Constitutional Order, 47 VIIL. L. REv. 37,66-72 (2002). 
457 Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 9, at 25-26. Some charitable choice programs are structured 
as voucher programs and thus constitute indirect aid. Id. at 26-28. These programs are even 
more constitutionally sound under current Court doctrine because they allow for the interven-
ing element of private choice, which, according to the Court, eliminates the risk of govern-
ment indoctrination. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002). For a critique of the 
private-choice rationale, see Laura S. Underkuffler, Vouchers and Beyond: The Individual 
As Causative Agent in Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 75 IND. LJ. 167 (2000). 
458 See supra discussion of Locke v. Davey, text accompanying notes 373-86. 
459 See supra text accompanying note 378. 
460 See supra text accompanying notes 441-49. 
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The regulatory review orders were designed to coordinate policy among the agencies 
and to avoid duplication, overlap, and conflict.461 By contrast, President Bush did not 
issue the CCEOs to improve executive-branch management, but to foster a larger 
executive-branch strategy to move religion into the public square and to reward and 
pursue religious voters.462 The CCEOs do impose a uniform policy across agencies 
and thereby avoid intra-agency differences, but this is simply the end-result of the 
President's executive strategy. In other words, consistency is not the reason for the 
policy; it is the byproduct of how the policy was implemented. To be sure, the 
President is in a unique position to guarantee faithful execution of the laws due to 
"his national constituency" and his position at the apex of the executive branch.463 
However, the very wording of the Take Care Clause tells the President to ensure "that 
the laws are faithfully executed";464 it does not give him the power to execute those 
laws himself. The wording of the clause presumes that executive subordinates will 
be carrying out Congress's mandates under the President's watchful eye. Most impor-
tantly, the Take Care Clause and its emphasis onfaithfulness assumes that these attri-
butes of presidential power and position will be used to further fidelity to externally 
defined norms-not those of the President alone. 
The CCEOs also go further than the regulatory review orders in imposing the 
President's policy preferences on the agencies. The regulatory review orders favored 
cost-benefit assessment as a decision-making too1.465 While they imposed a substan-
tive value on the decision-making process, they did not mandate a substantive result 
in any particular rulemaking. The agencies were free to conduct cost-benefit balanc-
ing in line with their expertise, and the President could not mandate a particular result. 
By contrast, the CCEOs mandate that all of the human services agencies open their 
doors to some faith-based contracting,466 even if they were to determine independ-
ently that a faith-based approach is not appropriate for any of their programs or that 
a faith-based approach raised too many constitutional entanglement issues to make 
such contracting worthwhile. The agencies were forced to adopt the President's policy 
preference regardless of the public input gathered through notice and comment pro-
ceedings. Indeed, the notice and comment proceedings were largely a sham because 
the outcome was predetermined. The role of the White House is not "advisory and 
consultative" as with the regulatory review orders, but directive. Thus, the heart of 
the issue in assessing the legality of the CCEOs is whether the President can direct 
the agencies to adopt a specific policy. 
461 See Shane, supra note 416, at 1245. 
462 See supra text accompanying note 72. 
463 See supra text accompanying note 445. 
464 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
465 See supra text accompanying notes 423-31. 
466 See supra Part I.B. 
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B. Presidential Directory Authority 
The President has extensive persuasive powers in his arsenal short of exercising 
directory authority. Not only can he command the public's attention, but he also has 
the power to set budgetary priorities and to appoint and remove agency heads with 
the resultant loyalty of officials throughout the bureaucracy.467 Where a statute vests 
an agency with decision-making discretion, it is entirely appropriate for the President 
to try to prod the agency in his favored direction although the agency must ultimately 
provide factual support for its rules.468 Thus, in Rust, the anti-abortion stance of the 
Reagan Administration was reflected in a gag rule, but the regulation was issued and 
justified by the Secretary of Health and Human Services.469 So, while the Secretary 
was undoubtedly subject to presidential pressure, the rule was nevertheless that of 
the agency.470 However, when a President directs an agency to adopt a specific re-
sult, he goes further than these informal methods of persuasion by substituting presi-
dential preferences for agency analysis and public input. Directory authority thereby 
"tear[s] down the structures of law and regularity Congress has built up in relation 
to the presidency."471 
Even if the agencies could have adopted charitable choice policies within their 
statutory mandates, the question would still remain as to whether the President could 
substitute his judgment for that of the agencies. That is, even if there is the oppor-
tunity for gap-filling, it does not mean that the President can fill the gap. The agen-
cies alone might have that job. Recall the statutes discussed earlier.472 The Public 
Awareness in Underserved Communities statute gives authority to the Director of the 
Office for Victims of Crime within the Department of Justice to make grants to further 
the statute's purposes.473 The HOPWA statute gives discretion to the Secretary of 
the Department of Health and Human Services to make grants to carry out the terms 
of the statute.474 Do these delegations permit the President to substitute his judgment 
for that of these delegatees? 
467 See PIERCE ET AL., supra note 171, at 81. 
468 See Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
469 See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
470 ''There is . . . an important formal distinction between the official who, as a mere 
agency for the President, may have his decisions immediately countermanded by the 
President and the official who has the independent power to decide, subject to being fired at 
the President's whim after-the-fact." Thomas O. McGarity, Presidential Control of Regulatory 
Agency Decisionmaking, 36 AM. U. L. REv. 443, 465 (1987); 
471 Peter L. Strauss, Presidential Rulemaking, 72 CHI.-KENTL. REv. 965, 985 (1997). 
472 See supra text accompanying notes 207-22. 
473 42 U.S.c. § 10,603(c)(l)(A) (2000). 
474 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,901-12 (2000). 
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1. Presidentialist v. Anti-Presidentialist Perspectives 
Almost all presidential scholars agree that the Framers chose a unitary executive, 
rather than multiple executives, to promote important constitutional values of effi-
ciency and accountability.475 Where scholars disagree is whether these values can 
ever yield to countervailing constitutional concerns, such as checks and balances, 
participatory norms, or restraints on arbitrariness. Unitary executive enthusiasts 
contend that the President is at the apex of the executive branch, that all executive 
officers serve in his stead, and that, therefore, the President can direct the outcome 
of the executive officers' exercise of delegated powers.476 As Steven Calabresi and 
Saikrishna Prakash put it: "[I]t is the President, under our Constitution, who must 
always be the ultimate empowered and responsible actor.,,477 Some presidentialists 
make an originalist case for their position based on constitutional text, structure, 
and pre- and post-enactment history.478 They contend that only a unitary executive 
secure from congressional control can foster accountability and efficiency. These 
twin values are also decisive for non-originalists such as Cass Sunstein and Lawrence 
Lessig, who contend that although the Framers did not create a unitary executive, 
the modem massive administrative state demands one to maintain fidelity to these 
constitutional commitments.479 Elena Kagan doubts that a unitary executive is consti-
tutionally required but agrees that "the values of accountability and efficiency [are] 
the principal values that all models of administration must attempt to further" and 
justify presidential directory authority.480 
By contrast, those more wary of presidential power argue that agencies are 
delegates of Congress and not instruments of the executive. Critical response to 
the Reagan regulatory review order481 articulated this position sharply. As Morton 
475 See, e.g., Robert V. Percival, Presidential Management of the Administrative State: 
The Not-So-Unitary Executive, 51 DUKEL.J. 963, 967 (2001) ("By placing executive authority 
in a single person, the Framers sought to create a chief executive who would be energetic, 
effective, and accountable."). 
476 See Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power to Execute 
the Laws, 104 YALELJ. 541 (1994). 
477 See id. at 595-96; see also Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Argumentsfor the 
Unitary Executive, 48 ARK. L. REv. 23 (1995) [hereinafter Calabresi, Normative Arguments]; 
Steven Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural 
Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REv. 1153, 1159-70 (1992) (setting forth the position of unitary 
executive theorists); Michael A. Fitts, The Paradox of Power in the Modem State: Why a 
Unitary, Centralized Presidency May Not Exhibit Effective or Legitimate Leadership, 144 U. 
PA. L. REv. 827, 845-56 (1996) (summarizing the views of unitary executive supporters). 
478 See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 476. 
479 Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. 
L. REv. 1 (1994). 
480 Elena Kagan,PresidentiaIAdministration, 114HARV.L.REv. 2245,2251-52 (2001). 
481 See supra note 427 and accompanying text. 
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Rosenberg explained, the Framers "believed that the President would be a manage-
rial agent for the legislature rather than an independent source of domestic policy.,,482 
The anti-presidentialists contend that balance and dispersion of power among the three 
branches prevents tyranny by any single branch, a main concern of the Framers.483 
Abner Greene reviewed the historical record and concluded that the Framers were 
less concerned with accountability than "with making the machinery of government 
somewhat cumbersome, thus ensuring against the hegemony of one branch or per-
son.,,484 This anti-presidentialist perspective finds plenty of support in the constitu-
tional text, structure, and history-making an originalist case in either direction a 
tough sell, as the Supreme Court's waffling in both directions suggests. 
Supreme Court cases variously-and irreconcilably-reflect both views. Unitary 
executive supporters line up behind Myers v. United States,485 Bowsherv. Synar,486 
and INS v. Chadha 487 -decisions which limit Congress's ability to intrude on execu-
tive authority.488 Yet, despite the broad language in these cases, the Supreme Court 
has made it clear that the President's power is not as absolute as the unitary executive 
proponents would have it. For instance, limiting the broad sweep of the language 
in Myers, the Court has upheld the existence of independent agencies whose heads 
are insulated from presidential removal as well as independent counsels who also 
exercise powers out of the President's control. 489 These cases rebut the idea that the 
President can command all forms of administrative discretion.490 Accordingly, the 
conventional wisdom is that the President does not have directive authority over the 
agencies.491 However, the conventional wisdom does not match conventional practice. 
The reality is that Presidents have occasionally acted unilaterally (think Louisiana 
Purchase, Emancipation Proclamation, internment of Japanese-Americans during 
World War m. President Clinton relied on unilateral action to push his agenda in the 
face of a recalcitrant Congress; he "treated the sphere of regulation as his own, and 
482 Morton Rosenberg, Beyond the Limits of Executive Power: Presidential Control of 
Agency Rulemaking Under Executive Order 12,291, 80 MICH. L. REv. 193,202-03 (1981). 
483 See Flaherty, supra note 415, at 1741; see also Percival, supra note 475, at 967-69 
(setting forth a textualist argument in favor of checks and balances). 
484 Greene, supra note 175, at 177. 
485 272 U.S. 52 (1926). 
486 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (holding that Congress cannot delegate budget functions to the 
Comptroller General). 
487 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (invalidating the legislative veto). 
488 See Barksdale, supra note 415, at 290-92 ("[T]he Court has vacillated between 
two sharply divergent visions of the constitutional role of the President in administrative 
decisionmaking. "). 
489 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (upholding the office of the independent 
counsel); Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935) (upholding the con-
stitutionality of the independent agencies). 
490 See Barksdale, supra note 415, at 294. 
491 See Kagan, supra note 480, at 2250-51; Percival, supra note 475, at 965. 
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in doing so made it his own, in a way no .other modern President had done.,,492 
Whereas Reagan and Bush never claimed that they had directive authority over the 
agencies, Clinton proudly proclaimed that he did.493 Clinton issued at least 107 direc-
tives, including some controversial orders that converted millions of acres of public 
land into national monuments, prohibited federal discrimination based on sexual ori-
entation, imposed pro-environmental policies on federal entities, and required federal 
agencies to hire a certain amount of welfare recipients and disabled persons.494 The 
CCEOs follow in the Clinton mode. 
2. Accountability and Efficiency 
President Bush's exercise of presidential directory authority in the CCEOs is 
humdrum, business-as-usual forpresidentialists; by contrast, anti-presidentialists view 
the orders as yet another sign of an imperial presidency run amuck. It is not necessary, 
however, to resolve the historical or normative debates between these competing 
theories of the presidency to assess the legality of the CCEOs. Even if we accept uni-
tarian premises and assume that accountability and efficiency are paramount consti-
tutional objectives, the CCEOs do not serve these values. Thus, under no competing 
theory can they be justified as legitimate exercises of presidential power. Byexplor-
ing how the CCEOs relate to the goals of accountability and efficiency, we can begin 
to divine the parameters of Justice Jackson's "zone of twilight."495 
Accountability is best defined as "the ability of one actor to demand an expla-
nation or justification of another actor for its actions and to reward or punish that 
second actor on the basis of its performance or its explanation.,,496 Fans of the unitary 
executive make several accountability claims in connection with the President. They 
point out that the thousands of bureaucrats that work in federal agencies are unelected 
and hidden from view, while the President is directly accountable to the entire elec-
torate.497 The President also has a broad, national perspective, one not shared by 
492 See Kagan, supra note 480, at 2281. See generally THE PRESIDENCY AND THE LAW: 
THE CLINTON LEGACY (David Gray Adler & Michael Genovese eds., 2002). 
493 See Kagan, supra note 480, at 2289-303; Strauss, supra note 471, at 965-68. 
494 See Kagan, supra note 480, at 2294-96. Clinton's strategy was not always a success. 
For instance, his high-profile efforts to have the FDA regulate tobacco failed in the courts 
as did his striker replacement executive order. See supra text accompanying notes 286-98. 
495 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,637 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring). 
496 Edward Rubin, The Myth of Accountability and the Anti-Administrative Impulse, 103 
MICH. L. REv. 2073, 2073 (2005). 
497 See Lloyd N. Cutler & David R. Johnson, Regulation and the Political Process, 84 
YALE LJ. 1395, 1405~6 (1975) (noting that regulation often involves political choices rather 
than solely technical decisions). 
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bureaucrats who often operate within the narrow zone of their expertise. 498 Given that 
many administrative decisions require resolution of policy disputes, the President is 
in the best position to consider how those policies play out on a national stage.499 
In addition, citizens can associate presidential actions with a specific person and 
punish or reward the President for those actions.5°O With regard to efficiency, the 
President is uniquely situated to coordinate efforts across the federal bureaucracy and 
has the energy to put ideas into action.501 In The Federalist, Alexander Hamilton 
articulated this idea: "Energy in the executive is a leading character in the definition 
of good government. ,,502 Due to the spotlight generated by his national position, the 
President can center attention on a specific issue and bring energy to its resolution.503 
However, the benefits of efficiency and accountability associated with a unitary 
executive are merely assumptions. The CCEOs provide a vehicle for taking these 
assumptions for a test drive. 
Clearly, President Bush brought great efficiency and energy to the implementation 
of charitable choice. He moved quickly to announce the policy.504 He set up com-
mand posts throughout the bureaucracy to implement it.505 He disseminated infor-
mation about the policy from his bully pulpit,506 He harnessed the bureaucracy to 
promote the initiative to grantees and the states.507 Yet the virtues of efficiency have 
an obvious downside. Sometimes, efficiency simply means that the President can 
put questionable policies into effect very quickly with little thought, analysis, or input 
from the public or affected groups. Furthermore, although efficiency is desirable in 
certain circumstances, it is not a primary value with regard to lawmaking. The Framers 
purposely gave lawmaking powers to the cumbersome and slow-moving legislative 
branch.508 President Bush's failure to get the initiative passed into law despite the 
great energy that attends his office underscores the policy's dubious origins. 
Although the CCEOs harnessed the President's efficiency, if not dangerously 
so, they cannot be said to foster any facet of accountability. Unitary executive propo-
nents tout increased transparency as a benefit of directive authority. 509 As this argu-
ment goes, when policies are issued from within massive, unelected bureaucracies, 
it is hard to pinpoint who is generating the policies and thereby impossible to influence 
498 /d. 
499 [d. 
500 See Kagan, supra note 480, at 2331-34. 
501 See Calabresi, Normative Arguments, supra note 477, at 37-38. 
502 THE FEDERAUSTNo. 70, at 471 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
503 See Kagan, supra note 480, at 2332. 
504 See supra text accompanying note 73. 
505 See supra text accompanying note 74. 
506 See supra text accompanying notes 97, 108. 
507 See supra text accompanying notes 109-15. 
508 See supra text accompanying note 484. 
509 See Kagan, supra note 480, at 2331-34. 
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the policies or hold the policy-makers to account. 510 The CCEOs are clearly the handi-
work of President Bush, who makes no secret of his end run around Congress,511 and 
in that sense, their provenance is highly transparent. However, the CCEOs are com-
plicated, and it is not clear that Americans either understand or approve of them.512 
Thus, while the source of the CCEOs is transparent, the CCEOs themselves are fairly 
inscrutable. Moreover, transparency is not at risk with this issue. Charitable choice 
is a highly polarizing subject that is being closely tracked by national religious orga-
nizations, civil liberties groups, anti-poverty organizations, and conservative think 
tanks.513 Thus, any administrative action in this area would have been quickly pounced 
on by interested groups-as happened in the legislative arena.514 Charitable choice 
is simply not an issue that risks getting hidden in the mists of the bureaucratic jungle, 
and thus transparency is not a sufficient justification for preferring presidential action 
on this issue. Moreover, the transparency argument is concerned with the nature of 
bureaucracies and compares the President to the agencies;515 it does not draw a com-
parison between the President and Congress. 
Presidentialists do not argue that Congress lacks transparency; for better or worse, 
it does.516 Rather, they contend that Congress is prone to factionalism and responds 
only to state and local pork barrel concerns.517 Thus, the President is better suited to 
take broad, national concerns into consideration in shaping national policies. How-
ever, where human services are concerned, state and local influence is arguably the 
goal, and federalism is the defining model. Most social services are delivered at the 
local level, where officials are deemed better able to identify and respond to the 
unique needs of their communities. 518 For instance, what it takes to help the jobless 
510 [d. 
511 See supra text accompanying notes 88-89. 
512 See infra text accompanying notes 533-35 (summarizing polling data). 
513 See, e.g., infra notes 528-37; supra notes 117, 121,351. 
514 Agency rulemaking might actually enhance public participation more than the legislative 
process because the costs of participation are lower and the policy stakes for interested groups 
are better defined. See Peter H. Schuck, Delegation and Democracy: Comments on David 
Schoenbrod, 20 CARDOZO L. REv. 775 (1999). 
515 See supra text accompanying note 497. 
516 See Adrian Vermeule, The Constitutional Law of Congressional Procedure, 71 U.CHI. 
L. REv. 361, 412-13 (2004). 
517 See Calabresi, Normative Arguments, supra note 477, at 34-36. Jide Nzelibe strongly 
disputes this characterization, concluding that "the collective wisdom of these parochial legis-
lators [in Congress] will often produce policy outcomes that are more national and public-
regarding than those produced by any single elected official." Jide Nzelibe, The Fable of the 
Nationalist President and the Parochial Congress, 53 UCLA L. REv. 1217, 1222 (2006). 
This is because "Congress is subject to a wider range of pluralist voices and interest groups 
than any other political actor (including the president), which means that Congress is likely 
to receive better information regarding the relative costs and benefits of competing policy 
proposals." [d. 
518 See Theodore J. Lowi, Federalism, in 1 POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: AN 
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in New York City is very different than what it takes in rural North Dakota. In 
today's human services system, the federal government's role is mainly to disburse 
funds to state and local governments and establish overarching goals; local govern-
ments then decide how best to structure their programs. 519 President Bush's charitable 
choice initiative thus runs counter to the highly devolved and decentralized system 
of social service delivery in this country as well as to his own commitment to feder-
alism and professed preference for localized solutions to social problems.52o 
The CCEOs also threaten the federal-state balance in this area because they 
conflict with a slew of state constitutional provisions that are more protective of 
anti-establishment values than the U.S. Constitution, as well as state and local anti-
discrimination laws that do not exempt religious organizations.521 Courts and com-
mentators are grappling with how to resolve these conflicts.522 The CCEOs permit 
religious grantees to hire co-religionists.523 However, many state and local employ-
ment statutes do not grant a similar exemption to religious organizations that accept 
government funds.524 It is unclear how to reconcile these policies, and the agency 
regulations do nothing to clarify the issue. For its part, the White House is urging 
a uniform federal exemption from anti-discrimination statutes for religious organi-
zations while leaving it to courts "to provide guidance on whether faith-based organi-
zations are required to comply with State and local ordinances that restrict their ability 
to participate in Federally funded formula and block grant programs."525 The CCEOs 
also conflict with some state constitutions, which have higher anti-establishment bars 
than the U.S. Constitution.526 By imposing a national preference for faith-based 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HISTORY, POLITICS, AND POUCY 310, 312-13 (Gwendolyn Mink & Alice 
O'Connor eds., 2004). Lowi points out that state and local governments are inherently con-
servative due to their responsibility to maintain social order. /d. at 312. Devolution also allows 
higher levels of government to push political conflict to lower levels of government where ''the 
conflicts between charity and ideology are most keenly felt." JOEL F. HANDLER & YEHESKEL 
HASENFELD,WETHEPOORPEOPLE:WORK,POVERTY,ANDWELFARE19-20,208-09(1997). 
519 See Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 1367, 
1377-94 (2003). 
520 See FORMICOLA ET AL., supra note 2, at 105. 
521 See infra note 526. 
522 See supra text accompanying notes 160-61. 
523 See supra text accompanying note 159. 
524 See supra text accompanying notes 159-66. 
525 WHITE HOUSE FAITH-BASED & CMTY. INITIATIVES, PROTECTING THE CIVIL RIGHTS AND 
REUGIOUS LmERTY OFF AITH BASED ORGANIZATIONS: WHY REuGIOUS HIRING RIGHTS MUST 
BE PRESERVED 8, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/govemmentJfbci!booklet.pdf(last 
visited Apr. 4, 2007). 
526 See generally Jay S. Bybee & David W.Newton, Of Orphans and Vouchers: Nevada's 
"Little Blaine Amendment" and the Future of Religious Participation in Public Programs, 
2 NEV. LJ. 551 (2002); Kyle Duncan, Secularism's Laws: State Blaine Amendments and 
Religious Persecution, 72 FORDHAM L. REv. 493 (2003); Jill Goldenziel, Blaine's Name in 
Vain?: State Constitutions, School Choice, and Charitable Choice, 83 DENV. U. L. REv. 57 
(2005). 
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organizations in human services, the President may be undermining state choices 
and guaranteeing turmoil in federal-state relations. For these reasons, Congress's 
factionalism may actually be an advantage when considering faith-based solutions 
to social problems, whereas the President's national perspective is ill-suited to social 
service delivery. 
Moreover, while accountability is widely-touted as a hallmark of the office of 
the President, it is not clear who, if anyone, can hold the President accountable-the 
public? Program beneficiaries? Regulated entities? The President's supporters?527 
It is worth considering each of these groups in turn. To begin with, the CCEOs do not 
embody the majority will. In 2005, sixty-six percent of the public approved allow-
ing churches to apply for government funding (a notable decline from seventy-five 
percent in Bush's first term), but this number is misleading.528 We have long had 
government funding of religious groups to deliver social services, so it is hard to know 
whether the people surveyed were just approving a long-standing practice or whether 
they were approving the specifics of Bush 's approach. The data suggest the former.529 
Most Americans have deep reservations about how the CCEOs involve churches in 
human services.530 A majority of Americans do not want the government to fund 
non-Judeo-Christian religious groups, such as Muslims, Buddhists, the Nation of 
Islam, and Scientologists;531 yet non-discrimination among grantees is constitution-
ally required and guaranteed by the CCEOs.532 Sixty-eight percent of Americans are 
worried that faith-based initiatives will lead to too much government involvement 
with religion.533 Sixty percent are worried that religious groups will proselytize 
among recipients (a concern that is supported by growing evidence), and the same 
percentage would ban groups that encourage conversion from receiving funds.534 
Seventy-eight percent of Americans are opposed to grantee organizations hiring only 
co-religionists,535 as the CCEOs permit. 536 As the Pew Research Forum on Religion 
527 This analysis is based on questions posed by Peter M. Shane, Political Accountability 
in a System of Checks and Balances: The Case of Presidential Review of Rulemaking, 48 ARK. 
L. REv. 161, 196-209 (1995). 
528 PEw RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE PEoPLE & THE PRESS & PEW FORUM ON RELGION & 
PUBUC LIFE, PUBUC DIVIDED ON ORIGINS OF LIFE: REUGION A STRENGTH AND WEAKNESS 
FOR BOTH PARTIES 16 (2005), http://pewforum.org/publications/surveys/religion-politics-05.pdf. 
529 See id. 
530 THE PEW RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE PEoPLE & THE PRESS, FAITH-BASED fuNDING 
BACKED, BUT CHURCH-STATE DOUBTS ABOUND 1 (2001), hup://people-press.org/reportsl 
display.php3?ReportID=15 [hereinafter FAITH-BASED fuNDING]. 
531 [d. at 9-10. 
532 Exec. Order No. 13,279,3 C.F.R. 258, 259--60 (2003), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 
(2006). 
533 FAITH-BASED fuNDING, supra note 530, at 11-12. 
534 [d. at 11. 
535 [d. at 1, 14. 
536 3 C.F.R. at 260. 
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and Public Life concluded after conducting these surveys, "[ilt is clear ... that the 
public has yet to fully think through the details and implications of using government 
money to finance social service activities of churches and other houses ofworship."537 
Given Americans' qualms about charitable choice, it is more likely that Congress's 
rejection of H.R. 7538 represents the public's interest. To become law, a bill must be 
supported by a majority of Congress, providing "a much greater guarantee that legis-
lation passed by Congress has the wide popular support that the framers desired."539 
The legislative process thus serves values of deliberation and consensus. 
Even if the CCEOs represented the interests of a majority of Americans, relying 
on majority will as a measure of accountability is questionable. Do we really want a 
President who governs by polls?54o As the surveys regarding faith-based initiatives 
reveal, many Americans lack the information or comprehension of these complex 
church-state entanglements to come to a reasoned conclusion about them.541 More-
over, when the President acts unilaterally, he cuts off the debate and dialogue that 
would further inform Americans about these issues-including minority viewpoints 
that he has little incentive to consider. 
Alternatively, fans ofthe unitary executive might be more interested in promot-
ing accountability to the parties directly affected by regulation rather than the public 
at large. The CCEOs directly affect the non-profit sector that bids for human service 
contracts, churches newly eligible to apply for grants, and the beneficiaries of human 
service programs. Nevertheless, the initiative does not heighten the President's re-
sponsiveness to any of these groups. The non-profit sector is unhappy because it is 
now faced with new, unproven competitors in bidding over an ever-decreasing slice 
of the federal budgetary pie.542 Churches are highly divided over the wisdom of 
charitable choice, even within denominations.543 
The people most impacted by charitable choice have the least amount of access 
and influence over President Bush. They are the poor, the disadvantaged, children, 
the elderly, the physically ill, the mentally ill, and other needy persons. These are 
groups that vote in very low numbers and tend to vote Democratic.544 They do not 
537 FAITH-BASED FuNDING, supra note 530, at 5. 
538 See H.R. 7, 107th Congo (2001). 
539 Rosenberg, supra note 441, at 211. 
540 See Shane, supra note 527, at 198-99 ("A President whose every view tracked the 
majority in the latest relevant opinion poll would presumably be so conspicuously lacking 
in any internal compass as to call into question at least the President's capacity for leadership, 
not to mention his mental health."). 
541 See supra text accompanying notes 528-37. 
542 See supra text accompanying notes 219-20. 
543 See, e.g., FORMICOLAET AL., supra note 2, at 3. 
544 KAy L. SCHLOZMAN ET AL., AM. POL. SCI. ASS'N, INEQUALITIES OF POUTICAL VOICE 
23, available at http://www.apsanet.org/imgtest/voicememo.pdf(last visited Apr. 24, 2007) 
("Study after study has demonstrated that individuals with high socio-economic status ... are 
much more likely to be politically active."); id. at 59 (pointing out that the less affluent tend 
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constitute a powerful voting block that can change the outcome of elections. They 
lack the money that influences presidential campaigns and presidential policy prefer-
ences.545 Instead, their best chance at impacting public policies is through interest 
groups that advocate successfully on their behalf through legislative and administra-
tive processes.546 These particular interest groups have no access to or influence over 
President Bush. 
This is not to say that affected disadvantaged groups oppose charitable choice. 
Due to their exclusion from the political process, it is hard to know what they think 
about the initiative. Based on my experience representing low-income individuals, 
my sense is that people in need simply want programs that work regardless of who 
the provider is. However, charitable choice's effectiveness is questionable according 
to the data,547 while there are very few mechanisms in place to ensure that religious 
grantees are accountable to the populations they serve.548 As a legal matter, religious 
organizations are immune from many forms of government scrutiny due to fears over 
entanglement with religion.549 As a practical matter, they are ill-suited to conduct 
the reporting and assessment functions that are part of government procurement 
processes.550 Thus, there is good reason to fear that these grantees are left to their 
own devices with no meaningful oversight, resulting in a lack of accountability in 
both the charitable choice policy's formation and its delivery. 
Clearly, the President is not pursuing the expansion of charitable choice in 
response to demands of the disadvantaged; he is pushing for massive cuts to human 
services programs while simultaneously forcing the private sector to bear more of 
the burden for solving social problems. 55! Furthermore, President Bush's emphasis 
on religion as a cure for societal problems is a new twist on the old theory of blam-
ing the needy for their plight. 552 If only the disadvantaged were more religious, this 
story goes, their problems would be solved. As Thomas Ross has explained, "[T]he 
to be Democrats). 
545 Jamin Raskin & John Bonifaz, Equal Protection and the Wealth Primary, 11 Y ALEL. 
& POL'y REv. 273, 274-75 (1993). 
546 Nevertheless, "the economically disadvantaged continue to be underrepresented in 
pressure politics." SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 544, at 45. 
547 See supra text accompanying notes 337-47. 
548 See Gilman, supra note 8, at 822-40. 
549 See id. at 836--43. 
550 See id. at 847-51. 
551 See Peter Baker & Christopher Lee, Previously Untargeted Programs at Risk: 68 Among 
Those Bush Seeks to Cut, WASH. POST, Feb. 12,2005, at A4; Jonathan Weisman, Budget Cuts 
Pass by a Slim Margin: Poor; Elderly and Students to Feel Pinch, WASH. POST, Feb. 2, 2006, 
at Al (discussing the House of Representatives 's implementation of the President's proposed 
budget cuts that will impact welfare recipients, students, and Medicaid recipients). 
552 See FORMICOLA ET AL., supra note 2, at 104 ("President Bush's focus in proposing 
the faith-based solutions has been on the personal or familial failures of those who need 
assistance."). 
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[i]nitiative assumes that fighting poverty effectively entails changing the moral beliefs 
of the poor and that government-sponsored service agencies have failed precisely 
because they have not done SO.,,553 Not surprisingly, supporters of charitable choice 
are more likely to believe that poverty results from individual failings.554 Yet given 
that the disadvantaged suffer from economic, medical, and socio-demographic forces 
often outside their control, this behavioral explanation for their status is flawed. 555 
It is also dangerous because it allows the government to avoid responsibility for solv-
ing some of the very problems it has played a hand in creating.556 
In any event, there is little evidence that President Bush is pushing charitable 
choice to mirror majority sentiment or to improve agency responsiveness to the people 
and groups affected by the initiative. Rather, the initiative delivers on the President's 
campaign promises to his conservative, religious supporters.557 This is the only group 
affected by the CCEOs that has access to and influence with the President. 558 Yet cap-
ture by a special interest religious group does not constitute accountability; to the 
contrary, it raises the specter of one of the Founders' worst fears, especially where 
religion is concerned. James Madison believed that a "multiplicity of sects" would 
diffuse and decentralize religious power so that no one religion could dominate and 
impose its views on others.559 Whereas the Framers sought political decentralization 
to avoid a national monopoly over religion, charitable choice imposes a uniform pro-
religion policy that threatens Establishment Clause protections. 560 The national con-
stituency of a unitary executive is supposed to avoid governance by faction, but the 
opposite has happened here.56) 
553 Thomas W. Ross, The Faith-Based Initiative: Anti-Poverty or Anti-Poor?, 9 GEO. J. ON 
POVERTY L. & POL'y, 167, 177 (2002). 
554 See WUTHNOW, supra note 58, at 300. 
555 See FORMICOLA ET AL., supra note 2, at 103-06; see also Michele Estrin Gilman, 
Poverty and Communitarianism: Toward a Community-Based Welfare System, 66 U. PITT. 
L. REv. 721, 745-50 (2005) (discussing and rebutting behaviorial theories of poverty). 
556 See FORMICOLA ET AL., supra note 2, at 106 ("[Faith-based initiatives] absolve large 
institutions of their responsibilities for causing the problems, and they are a giant step toward 
withdrawing government from its responsibilities to care for its citizens in need."). 
551 Bush's "opponents and supporters agree that he has done more than any president in 
recent history to advance the agenda of Christian social conservatives." Laurie Goodstein, 
Personal and Political, Bush's Faith Blurs Lines, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2004, at A21. 
558 [d. ("[D]ozens of conservative religious leaders, induding evangelical Christians, Cath-
olics and Jews, exulted at the unprecedented access they had had to this White House .... "); 
see also WUTHNOW, supra note 58, at 304 (discussing the Christian conservative movement's 
access to the White House). 
559 See Steven D. Smith, Blooming Confusion: Madison's Mixed Legacy, 75 IND. L.J. 61, 
70 (2000) (discussing Madison's FEDERALIST Nos. 10, 51); see also JOHN WITTE JR., 
REUGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT 46-48 (2d ed. 2005) 
(discussing similar views regarding religious pluralism held by other founders). 
560 See Schragger, supra note 386, at 1815, 1873 (arguing that the Supreme Court should 
have a more local perspective in interpreting the Religion Clauses). 
561 The initiative is also driving a wedge within African-American clergy. Some members 
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The strategy did pay offfor the President.562 In the 2000 election, the Christian 
Right delivered large blocs of voters to the President in key states and funded efforts 
during the primaries to defeat Senator John McCain.563 In the 2004 election against 
John Kerry, seventy-eight percent of evangelicals supported Bush, and the most tra-
ditionalist branches of all Christian groups voted for Bush overwhelmingly.564 For 
members of traditionalist religious groups, social issues were more important than 
economic issues or foreign policy in the 2004 election but were least important to all 
other voters.565 Bush's emphasis on religion and moral themes, of which the CCEOs 
were a major part, resonated strongly with his supporters. Surveys show that "sup-
port for the Christian conservative movement and support for government funding 
I of church-based service programs are closely related.,,566 However, rewarding the 
special interests of the few is leading to increased polarization in America along 
religious lines.567 This polarization runs counter to any notion of the public interest 
as well as founding commitments to religious liberty. As the Supreme Court has 
stated, while "political debate and division ... are normal and healthy manifesta-
tions of our democratic system of government, ... political division along religious 
lines was one of the principal evils against which [the Religion Clauses were] ... 
intended to protect."568 
It is hard to find any group that could hold President Bush to account on this 
issue. He was up for election twice and is now a lame duck. Research shows that 
voters do not cast ballots based on how the President acts on specific policy issues.569 
Rather, they elect someone who they consider like-minded, in part, so they do not 
have to monitor the "quotidian decisions, complex judgments, recondite bargains, and 
other actions" that are "beyond their ... attention span.,,570 This is the "opposite of 
feel that the President's initiative is giving them "a political home," while others claim that 
Bush is trying to "seduce[]" African-American conservatives. Neela Banerjee, Black Churches 
Struggle over Their Role in Politics: Conservatives Looking to Align with Bush, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 6, 2005, at N23. 
562 Jide Nzelibe explains that "the winner-take-all feature of the electoral college shows 
that it will often be in the president's interests to target benefits at a small group of voters at 
the expense of the rest of the population." Nzelibe, supra note 517, at 1248. Charitable choice 
may well fit this pattern. 
563 See FISHER, supra note 392, at 80. 
564 JOHN C. GREEN ET AL., THE AMERICAN REUGIOUS LANDSCAPE AND THE 2004 
PREsIDENTIAL VOTE: INCREASED POLARIZATION 2-3 (2005), http://pewforum.orglpublications! 
surveys/postelection. pdf. By contrast, Kerry had a more diverse coalition of supporters, in-
cluding minority faiths, the unaffiliated, and modernist Christians.ld. at 1-2. 
565 /d. at 10-12. 
566 See WUTHNOW, supra note 58, at 296. 
567 GREEN ET AL., supra note 564, at 1 ("The American religious landscape was strongly 
polarized in the 2004 presidential vote and more so than in 2000."). 
568 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622 (1971). 
569 See Shane, supra note 527, at 199. 
570 Rubin, supra note 496, at 2078. 
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accountability.,,57I In the 2000 presidential election, both candidates, Bush and Gore, 
touted a faith-based agenda.572 That, combined with the fact that President Bush did 
not win the popular vote,573 makes it hard to say that he had a mandate one way or 
the other with regard to charitable choice. In the 2004 election, voters conceivably 
could have punished the President for issuing the CCEOs, but foreign policy and 
economic priorities were more important to most voters, who gave him the edge on 
those particular issues.574 Even the most ardent supporters or vehement opponents 
of charitable choice, who single-mindedly voted on this issue alone (an unlikely 
group, to be sure), would not have been able to impact either election. For all these 
reasons, "intermittent, highly contested elections are simply very poor devices for 
holding a person accountable.,,575 
The President's charitable choice strategy has diminished rather than improved 
accountability. The CCEOs reduced public participation in the decision-making pro-
cess, cut off dialogue and debate, and denied the application of the agencies' expertise 
to the affected statutory prograrns.576 By contrast, "[v]irtually every plausible nor-
mative version of accountability seems to depend quite strongly on the availability 
of multiple pressure points within the bureaucracy, a diffusion of policy making in-
fluence, public dialogue, and a general fluidity in the value structure that guides the 
bureaucracy's decision-making.,,577 All of these components of accountability were 
sacrificed when the President unilaterally expanded charitable choice. The result was 
predetermined, so the notice and comment process was a sham. The agencies did not 
have to gather or analyze information to support their rulemakings, and they did not 
have to justify the result. The vigorous debate over constitutional values that ulti-
mately derailed the bills in Congress578 was curtailed. In short, there is no efficiency 
or accountability justification for the President's order to the federal agencies that 
they fund religious groups. 
Over fifty years later, the boundaries of Justice Jackson's zone of twilight579 
remain murky. No court or commentator has been able to devise a simple test to sep-
arate lawful presidential action from presidential overreaching, and it unlikely such 
571 [d. 
572 See supra text accompanying notes 67-72. 
573 See FEDERAL ELECTION COMMITTEE, 2000 OFFIClALPRESIDENTIAL GENERAL ELECTION 
RESULTS (2000), http://www.fec.gov/pubreC/fe2000/2000presge.htm(showinga vote margin 
of 593,895 or 0.41 %). 
574 See GREEN ET AL., supra note 564, at 1. 
575 Rubin, supra note 496, at 2079. 
576 See Barksdale, supra note415, at 304 (keeping decision-making in the hands of agencies 
"protects important legislative process values such as consensus building, citizen participation, 
deliberation, and diffusion of power"). 
577 Shane, supra note 527, at 212. 
578 See supra text accompanying notes 55-63. 
579 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring). 
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a test exists. As Justice Jackson recognized, "any actual test of power is likely to 
depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables rather than 
on abstract theories oflaw.,,580 The Youngstown majority's emphasis on congressional 
intent581 further muddies the waters because the courts differ over what methodologies 
and materials are legitimate sources for discerning Congress's will. As a result of 
these difficulties, the few lower courts to address these issues are assessing presi-
dential domestic policymaking solely by whether or not it conflicts with enacted 
statutes.582 Express conflicts are the easy cases; obviously, the President cannot im-
plement domestic policies that are contrary to existing statutes.583 The problem with 
this approach, however, is that it means the President can move freely in any zone 
untouched by Congress. And, conversely, where Congress has delegated statutory 
authority to an agency, the President can trump the agency's expertise with his own 
policy prescription. 
The case study of the CCEOs suggests that one way to think: about the President's 
powers within the zone of twilight is to focus on efficiency and accountability, which 
are, after all, the underlying reasons for and benefits of having a unitary executive. 
Purely theoretical contentions about the virtues or vices of a unitary executive make 
untested assumptions about these constitutional values.584 By contrast, the CCEOs 
demonstrate that we cannot presume that the President serves these values when he 
engages in policymaking.585 Yet where these values are furthered, we have less to fear 
from presidential policymaking and more confidence that the President is taking care 
that the laws are faithfully executed pursuant to some norm other than his personal 
preferences. Moreover, putting some boundaries on the zone of twilight would make 
exercises of presidential power more transparent because the President would have 
to articulate a basis for his actions. In turn, the President's rationale could be judged 
on its merits, rather than forcing courts to engage in an often fruitless search for legis-
lative intent that usually results in the aggrandizement of executive power. In search-
ing for a line between presidential lawmaking and gap-filling we should not forget 
that the Framers of the Constitution have given us valuable benchmarks by which to 
judge presidential action. We best serve both original understandings and modem 
realities by returning to the touchstones of accountability and efficiency. 
580 /d. 
581 See id. at 579, 587-89. 
582 See supra text accompanying notes 174-79. 
583 See McGarity, supra note 470, at 464 ("Congress may establish national domestic 
policy in duly enacted statutes, and the President may not unilaterally change that policy in 
executing those statutes .... Virtually all ofthe constitutional commentators agree with this 
modest proposition."). 
584 See generally Shane, supra note 527. 
585 See supra text accompanying notes 496-516. 
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CONCLUSION 
Debates over the scope of presidential power remain unresolved, but all sides 
agree that the founders feared tyranny by any single branch of government and con-
structed the Constitution to avoid such concentrations of power. Likewise, while 
there is little consensus about the extent and effect of the First Amendment's Religion 
Clauses, it is clear that religion holds a special place in our constitutional order-~me 
that demands an ongoing dialogue as we attempt to balance the many commitments 
to liberty of conscience that underlay the Religion clauses. President Bush's end run 
around Congress to dispense millions of dollars to religious organizations to further 
public purposes implicates both of these founding concerns. Despite the outcry over 
hiring discrimination that doomed the President's proposed legislation,586 there has 
been little public protest over how the President's initiative has been implemented. 
James Madison warned, "The essence of Government is power; and power, lodged 
as it must be in human hands, will ever be liable to abuse.,,587 We cannot point our 
fingers only at the President and accuse him of pursuing his own ambitions. The 
silence of the courts, Congress, and the people in the face of presidential lawmaking 
have allowed the "zone of twilight" to expand ever larger. And, where the brunt of 
presidential lawmaking falls on the disadvantaged, this zone threatens to become a 
black hole, into which the voices of the marginalized are lost forever. 
586 See BLACK ET AL., supra note 3, at 208. 
587 JAMES MADISON, Speech in the Virginia Constitutional Convention, in JAMES 
MADISON: WRITINGS 824 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999). 
